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CHAPTER I
American law, whether in the form of the United States 
Constitution, legislation, court decisions, or administrative 
action, continues to accord men and women different treatment 
solely because of their sex. Such discriminatory practices 
affect women in all ways of life and at every educational level. 
According to Timpano (1973), sex discrimination is an abuse of 
the law and a misuse of people, and it is propagating itself 
because much of it is unconscious and unconsidered.
Women educators, who are seeking fair and equitable treat­
ment in initial employment, promotion, tenure, and arbitrary 
maternity leave, now have new legal avenues to obtain redress. 
This legislation concerning the rights of women took 200 years 
to obtain. The United States Constitution did not mention 
them for more than a century, and the Constitutional Amendments 
were silent on the subject of women. For instance, the First 
Constitutional Amendment prohibited Congress from abridging the 
freedoms of speech and press. The Fifth Amendment stated that 
no person shall be punished without due process of law. And 
the Fourteenth Amendment, written in 1868 on behalf of black
2males who were being granted citizenship, covered all persons 
with equal protection under the law. In none of these amend­
ments were women named, except they were not excluded, as they 
had been in the Declaration of Independence which holds that 
all men are created equal (Goldin, 1976) .
To get the word "male" out of the Constitution cost women 
many years of campaigning. After 1865, there were several 
forceful organizations devoted to the crusade of women. The 
most important of these were the National Women's Suffrage 
Association (NlfSA) and the American Women's Suffrage Association 
(AWSA). A decade later the Congressional Union was established, 
which became the National Women's Party (NWP). The National 
Women's Party opposed President Wilson's re-election in 1916, 
and, foremost, the United States entrance into World War I on 
the grounds that democracy should begin at home (Women's Law 
Caucus, 1976). Perseverance by these groups and the collabo­
ration of others sensitive to the cause finally brought about 
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment which was proposed by 
Congress on June 5, 1919, and ratified August 26, 1920. It 
reads as follows :
The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall 
have the power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation (BabcocJt, Freedman, Norton, 1975).
3Still other groups supported the suffrage movement.
Working women supported the right to vote as a means to an end. 
That is, they sought political power to improve their economic 
plight. Upper and middle class women, on the other hand, tend­
ed to fight for suffrage as an end. For these, women suffrage 
represented the only right to which they aspired and had not 
yet won. Even with the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
the right to vote was at best an inefficient tool. There re­
mained those limitations in the law pertaining to jury service, 
property rights, marriage, divorce, and work that were yet to 
be eradicated. Women were not treated fairly. As an example, 
it was not until February 7, 1966, in White v. Crook, 251 F . 
Supp. 401 (N.D.Ala. 1966), that women were not excluded from 
jury service. In effect the vote had not eliminated sex dis­
crimination in American life.
Statement of the Problem
The problem for this investigation was to analyze litiga­
tion and to examine its implications for the employment of 
women in secondary and higher educational professions. This 
study was an attempt to answer the following questions:
1. What influence have recent court decisions had on 
traditional hiring practices?
2. What were the general categories or areas of concern 
that have prompted litigation?
3. What court rulings were antagonistic toward women's 
rights?
44. What fundamental issues were presented in litigation 
regarding rights for women?
5. What relationships existed between positions in 
secondary and higher education for women and litiga­
tion as an avenue for change?
6. What role did state and Federal legislation play in 
the litigation procedure?
Scope and Limitations
Women's quest for equality in the world of secondary and 
higher education has precipitated an attempt through court 
litigation to minimize discriminatory practices. Although 
court cases were cited in countless studies involving women, 
no studies reported systematic analysis of cases with respect 
to content. In order to visualize how women may achieve 
equality and increased opportunity in education, an under­
standing of the significance in the evidence presented within 
pertinent court cases is necessary.
Due to the massive quantity of materials dealing with 
women, a comprehensive study was difficult. The following 
limitations were therefore imposed upon the available research, 
literature, and litigation concerning women:
1. The research and literature studied related only to 
historical-legal matters dealing with women in or 
seeking positions in education.
2. Judicial decisions analyzed were those in the United 
States District Courts and state and Federal Appellate
5Courts, including the United States Supreme Court as 
reported in the National Reporter System.
Statement of Purposes
The need for this study arose from the increasing impor­
tance for educators to understand the relationship of court 
decisions regarding women and the applications of women seeking 
employment or employed in secondary and higher education. The 
purposes of this study were:
1. To clarify the relationship between litigation and the 
employment of women.
2. To investigate whether women were justified in exer­
cising their complaints within the courts.
3. To examine the influence of litigation and legislation 
regarding women in the hiring practices of educational 
institutions.
4. To identify the type of discrimination most prevalent 
in litigation.
5. To discover an avenue of change in regard to women and 
employment.
6. To identify aspects of the court rulings which pre­
sented problems to women.
"The amount and extent of discrimination against women in 
education has only begun to be discovered, challenged, and 
corrected" (Cronin, 1973, p. 138). Lawsuits dealing with women 
in education can be separated into several divisions. This 
study documented four categories: (1) tenure and promotion,
(2) appointment, (3) dismissal, and (4) pregnancy.
6Court cases involving each area were collected and studied. 
Each case cited basically the same laws, but had circumstances 
that were different and unique. However, court decisions and 
passage of laws alone were not enough for a successful solution 
to the problem. Through a thorough inquiry into all phases of 
the litigations which dealt with women in secondary and higher 
education, educators, laymen, and all those involved in the area 
of women's rights may benefit from the results of this study.
Definition of Terms 
For purposes of this investigation important terms were 
defined in the following manner:
Civil Rights. "Civil rights are such as belong to every 
citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, 
to all its inhabitants or administration of government.
They include the rights of property, marriage, protection 
by the laws, freedom of contract, trial by jury, etc." 
(Winnett v. Adams, 71 Neb. 817, 99 N.M. 681).
Discrimination. "In general, a failure to treat all 
equally; favoritism" (Mische v. Kaminski, 127 Pa. Super.
66, 193, A.410, 416).
Litigation. "Contest in a court of justice for the purpose 
of enforcing a right" (Summerour v. Fortson, 174 Ga. 862, 
164 S.E, 809).
Procedure
Judicial decisions resulting from suits brought under 
provisions of the United States Constitution and the various 
civil rights statutes have had a significant impact on the 
employment opportunities for women. This study involved a 
historical-legal search of literature bearing upon the rights 
of women in secondary and higher educational professions. The 
procedure associated with the collection of related materials 
involved the location, examination, and analysis of published 
materials located in libraries and various governmental agen­
cies. The first source of reference was the United States 
Constitution, as any reference to the laws of the United States 
are bound together by this document. The original case mater­
ials, legal periodicals, and state and Federal statutes were 
analyzed for content and importance. Relative questions were 
asked of each case studied. Only a cross section of court 
cases dealing with women in secondary and higher education in­
volving job discrimination were included.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
An explanation of selected cases which set the stage for 
court cases analyzed was necessary at this point. Landmark 
cases not dealing with educational matters are often used to 
emphasize a point or arrive at a verdict in educationally- 
related cases. Though history of women in litigation was not 
extensive, it is essential to the understanding of problems 
faced by women. The following material will expound on earlier 
cases emphasizing litigation dealing with women.
Historical Cases 
One of the earliest Supreme Court decisions upholding sex 
discrimination by state action was Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 
130 (U.S. 1872). The Illinois Supreme Court had denied a woman's 
application for a license to practice law solely because she was 
a female. The petitioner appealed this ruling to the Supreme 
Court on constitutional grounds. There was no opposing counsel, 
but none was needed since only Chief Justice Chase dissented 
from the decision affirming the denial of the application. 
Plaintiff's claim, based upon the privileges and immunities
8
9clause, was rejected by the Supreme Court which held that the 
practice of law was not one of the privileges or immunities 
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Justice Bradley's often quoted concurring opinion re­
flected 19th-century thinking concerning the woman's role in 
society:
Man is, or should be, women's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which 
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for 
many of the occupations of civil life. The constitu­
tion of the family organization, which is founded in 
the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, 
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly 
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The 
harmony. . . of interests and views which belong to the 
family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman 
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of 
her husband. . . . It is true that many women are un­
married and not affected by any of the duties, compli­
cations, and incapacities arising out of the married 
state, but these are exceptions to the general rule.
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to ful­
fill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil 
society must be adapted to the general constitution of 
things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases 
(Miller, 1974, p. 67).
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Essentially, the equal rights movement began with Bradwell
V .  Illinois (Miller, 1974). Twenty-one years after Bradwell v. 
Illinois the United States Supreme Court affirmed another 
state's denial of a woman's application for admission to law 
school in Ex Parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 166 (1893). This case 
reaffirmed the fundamental issue of the Bradwell case which was 
the right to practice law in the state courts and whether a 
woman was entitled to be admitted to practice law in that state 
(Kanowitz, 1968).
In Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 22 L. Ed.
627 (1875), an action was brought in the Circuit Court of 
St. Louis County, Missouri by the plaintiffs in error against 
the defendant, a registering officer, for refusing to register 
Virginia L. Minor as a lawful voter. The Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not confer on women citizens the right 
to vote, a position which stood until ratification of the 
suffrage amendment in 1920. In Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 
(1908),women's rights were again denied. The case concerned 
the validity of Oregon's law limiting the hours of wor)c for 
female factory employees to ten a day. That law was challenged, 
by an employer who had been convicted of violating it, as 
contravening the due process and equal protection guarantee of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court was responding to the 
demonstrated need for legislative protection of working con­
ditions. Yet the assumptions about women on which the Court 
based its decision in Muller v. Oregon had become firmly
11
entrenched in judicial doctrine. Again the findings were that 
the apparent difference in physical endurance and strength be­
tween men and women justified the state's restriction on the 
right of women to work.
The Court sustained other labor laws for women in subse­
quent years as reasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), a minimum 
wage law for women was upheld as a reasonable exercise of the 
state's police power. In Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924), 
a law prohibiting nighttime employment of women in restaurants 
was held as not unreasonably discriminatory. More recently, in 
Hoyt V .  Florida, 368 U.S.57, 60 (1961), the Court upheld a 
Florida statute providing that no female would be called for 
jury list. The Court found that such discrimination was per­
missible under the Fourteenth Amendment since it was reasonable.
Prior to November 22, 1971, the United States Supreme 
Court had never invalidated any law or regulation discriminating 
between people solely on account of their sex. In a number of 
earlier decisions spanning almost a century from Bradwell v. 
Illinois in 1873 through Hoyt v. Florida in 1961, the Court 
had uniformly rejected the argument that various sex-based state 
laws contravened certain guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
By 19 61, the constitutionality of sex discriminatory laws 
appeared to be well settled.
On November 22, 1971, the United States Supreme Court, in 
a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burger, held 
that a statutory classification based upon sex was in violation
12
of equal protection. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.71, 92 S. Ct. 251, 
30 L. Ed. 225 (1971), the first decision of the United States 
Supreme Court to hold that such a distinction based upon sex 
violates the equal protection clause, was a step forward in the 
struggle to achieve equal status between the sexes (Miller, 
1974). At issue was an Idaho statute setting priorities for 
appointment of individuals to administer estates. The dispute 
in Reed v. Reed was between the defendant’s :adoptive parents. 
The mother had challenged the order of the probate court which 
granted letters of administration to the father in obedience 
to the contested statute. The Supreme Court of Idaho rejected 
her argument that the statute violated the equal protection 
clause. The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed 
the decision with a short opinion by Chief Justice Burger.
The year 1972 featured Frontière v . Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677 (1972), the pinnacle of the Court's conscious raising.
In Frontiero v. Richardson an Air Force officer attempted to 
claim her husband as a dependent in order to obtain housing 
and medical benefits. Her cJ aim was denied by the majority of 
a three-judge district court.
Although no other sex discrimination decisions were handed 
down during the United States Supreme Court's 1972 term, the 
next term provided two major cases. The first was LaFleur v. 
Cleveland Board of Education, 414 U.S. 632, (1974), in which
the Court considered the validity of mandatory pregnancy leave 
regulations imposed by two public school boards upon their
13
female teachers. The purpose of the regulation in dealing with 
pregnancy was to protect the teachers from ridicule, violence, 
and medical complications while also assuring the continuity of 
classroom instruction. It then concluded that the regulation 
was entirely reasonable.
The second major decision was Cohen v. Chesterfield County 
School Board, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973). In this Virginia 
case the mandatory termination provision of the teacher's employ­
ment contract was declared unconstitutional. The plaintiff's 
baby was due April 28, 1971. She had requested maternity leave 
effective April 1, 1971. Instead, the School Board had placed 
her on leave effective December 18, 1970. The court granted 
relief necessary to put her in the same position as if she had 
been allowed to teach until April 1, 1971, with salary, senior­
ity, and any and all other rights and benefits she would have
received had she been teaching during that period.
In both the LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education and
Cohen V .  Chesterfield County School Board cases, the Equal Em­
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed an amicus brief in 
the court supporting the teachers' position. Certainly their 
involvement helped in obtaining the favorable decisions made by 
the United States Supreme Court.
LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education and Cohen v. 
Chesterfield County School Board are two landmark cases involving 
women in education. Other landmark cases not pertaining to 
educational matters, and the two cases previously mentioned.
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were cited numerous times in later cases. They laid the 
foundations for decisions made in litigation to follow.
State and Federal Legislation 
In recent years, no doubt partly due to a general rekin­
dling of interest in the status of women in society and the 
emergence of positive corrective legislation in the field, con­
stitutional challenges of laws that discriminated on grounds of 
sex have increased. Progress has been made, particularly in 
the area of equality in salary, so that faculty, administrators, 
and non-professional staff receive millions of dollars in in­
creases and accumulate back pay after institutions re-examine 
salary scales for compliance with the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 
section 206 (d), and Executive Order 11246, 3C.F.R. 339, in 1965.
First, an act used by the schools was the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA). As amended, this law, known as the 
Federal minimum wage and hour law, covered the great majority 
of workers. It applied generally to employers whose gross 
volume of sales exceeded $250,000 a year. However, employees 
engaged in laundering, drycleaning, and repair of clothes or 
textiles, and workers in hospitals (except Federal), nursing 
homes, and schools (public and private) were covered, irrespec­
tive of the dollar volume the establishment grossed.
The 1974 amendments to the act extended coverage to 6.7 
million additional workers. Among the newly covered were most 
private household workers (except casual babysitters and com­
panions for the aged and infirm) and additional retail and
15
service employees. The law was enforced by the Wage and Hour 
Division of the United States Department of Labor. All com­
plaints received were treated in strict confidence. Provisions 
of the act provided that unpaid wages could be restored under 
the supervision of the Secretary or employees and that employers 
could not, by law, fire or otherwise discriminate against a 
worker on the basis of a complaint.
The Equal Pay Act of 19 6 3 amended the FLSA to prohibit 
discrimination based on sex in earnings, including overtime pay 
and most fringe benefits. The Federal Equal Pay Act was enacted 
in 1963, one year before passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
In contrast to Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimina­
tion in employment opportunities, the Equal Pay Act was support­
ed by an extensive legislative history, including elaborate 
committee hearings demonstrating widespread wage discrimination 
against women (Kanowitz, 1973).
The heart of the Equal Pay Act was found in Section 3, 
adding a new subsection (d) to Section 6 of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. section 201, of 1938, which provided 
in part that:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions 
of this section shall discriminate, within any establish­
ment in which such employees are employed, between 
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees 
in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at 
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in 
such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance
16
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, 
and which are performed under similar working conditions, 
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a 
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system 
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of pro­
duction; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor 
other than sex;. . . .
The Education Amendments of 1972 included an amendment to 
the Equal Pay Act of 1963. This act now covers teachers and 
other professional pe^jgMNg0N0||Kgcational institutions at all 
levels, and prohiyBB||BwB ^ B W H M j j^ ^ B j^ , the basis of sex. 
Generally, the performed the same
work, or subste|j|HHBM jB i B | B B H ^ ^ ^ ^ B ^ K^iring equal skills, 
effort, responsBBBB B H B l ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B B Pcational backgrounds 
as their male C(^|B|BB|IBBj W B B |^BBBplve comparable pay.
Mere differen^NNNg N M N U B U IjU M U R :s will not be considered 
a sufficient reason to^^S^BjB|pi^Ppay. Women who have exper­
ience and degrees equal to their male counterparts, but who do 
not receive the same teaching load, can challenge the failure 
of an institution to pay them the same salary. Victims of 
discrimination in pay may be awarded back pay for up to two 
years for nonwillful and three years for willful violations of 
the act.
This act is enforced by the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Employment Standards Administration of the Department of Labor. 
Individuals or organizations may file complaints on their own 
behalf or on the behalf of others. Every effort is made to
keep the identity of complainants confidential tnless ts-trt 
action is required to enforce the act. Prior to cotrt enfcr; 
ment, voluntary compliance is requested (Hallan, 19733 _
Discriminatory employment practices in both puhlit and 
private educational institutions which have five or tore c =p. 
ees were prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Art of 
1964, 42 U.S.C.A. (See Appendix A). Title VII of the livtl 
Eights Act of 1964, which became effective on July 2, 1965, 
prohibited discrimination based on race, color, rcligim, sej 
or national origin in all aspects of employment. It ccr.'ere-d 
discrimination in hiring, firing, layoff, recall, rerruitmen.t 
wages, conditions of employment, promotional opportunities, 
assignment, sick leave, vacations, overtime, insurance henefH 
retirement programs, and employment advertising.
To handle complaints of employment discrimination, the 
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), a bipartisat 
agency, was created under this title. The role of the ccmtlc 
sion was defined primarily in terms of investigation and 
conciliation; its enforcement authority was limited. The EEC: 
consists of five commissioners who serve five-year terms on a 
staggered basis. Commissioners are appointed by the Preslden; 
subject to the Senate's consent, with one member designated a.; 
a chairman who is responsible for the commission's administra­
tive operations.
Complaints may be filed with the EEOC by individuals, 
groups of individuals, or by organizations on behalf of othere 
Within ten days after a charge is filed, the EEOC must notify
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of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, 
and which are performed under similar working conditions, 
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a 
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system 
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of pro­
duction; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor 
other than sex;. . . .
The Education Amendments of 1972 included an amendment to 
the Equal Pay Act of 1963. This act now covers teachers and 
other professional personnel in educational institutions at all 
levels, and prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. 
Generally, the act provided that women who performed the same 
work, or substantially the same work, requiring equal skills, 
effort, responsibilities, and similar educational backgrounds 
as their male counterparts, should receive comparable pay.
Mere differences in position titles will not be considered 
a sufficient reason to deny equal pay. Women who have exper­
ience and degrees equal to their male counterparts, but who do 
not receive the same teaching load, can challenge the failure 
of an institution to pay them the same salary. Victims of 
discrimination in pay may be awarded back pay for up to two 
years for nonwillful and three years for willful violations of 
the act.
This act is enforced by the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Employment Standards Administration of the Department of Labor. 
Individuals or organizations may file complaints on their own 
behalf or on the behalf of others. Every effort is made to
17
keep the identity of complainants confidential unless court 
action is required to enforce the act. Prior to court enforce­
ment, voluntary compliance is requested (Hallam, 1973).
Discriminatory employment practices in both public and 
private educational institutions which have five or more employ­
ees were prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C.A. (See Appendix A ) . Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which became effective on July 2, 1965, 
prohibited discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin in all aspects of employment. It covered 
discrimination in hiring, firing, layoff, recall, recruitment, 
wages, conditions of employment, promotional opportunities, 
assignment, sick leave, vacations, overtime, insurance benefits, 
retirement programs, and employment advertising.
To handle complaints of employment discrimination, the 
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), a bipartisan 
agency, was created under this title. The role of the commis­
sion was defined primarily in terms of investigation and 
conciliation; its enforcement authority was limited. The EEOC 
consists of five commissioners who serve five-year terms on a 
staggered basis. Commissioners are appointed by the President 
subject to the Senate's consent, with one member designated as 
a chairman who is responsible for the commission's administra­
tive operations.
Complaints may be filed with the EEOC by individuals, 
groups of individuals, or by organizations on behalf of others. 
Within ten days after a charge is filed, the EEOC must notify
18
the employer of the charge. Generally, the names of individuals 
involved are kept as confidential as possible. If the complaint 
is filed in a state or locality which has a law covering dis­
crimination of the charged and the enforcing agency of the state 
or locality includes enforcement powers similar to EEOC, the 
complaint will be referred to that agency for a period of 60 
days. The EEOC investigates complaints and seeks voluntary 
compliance by the employer. When discrimination is found, the 
commission attempts to eliminate it and seeks compensation for 
those affected.
If conciliation fails, the EEOC may bring suit against a 
private employer, employment agency, or labor union. In the 
case of state or local government employers, the charge is 
referred to the United States Attorney General, who, within 
180 days, will decide whether or not to bring suit. If the 
Attorney General does not bring suit, the complaining party 
may do so.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's guidelines on the 
meaning of sex discrimination cover discrimination in employment 
policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth as well as dis­
crimination on the basis of marital status. According to the 
guidelines, written or unwritten employment policies which ex­
clude applicants from employment or require forced leave because 
of pregnancy are in prima facie violation of Title VII. The 
guidelines also require that disabilities related to pregnancy 
be treated as temporary disabilities under health, temporary 
disability, and sick leave plans. In addition, restrictions on
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the employment of married women which are not applicable to 
married men are prohibited. Complaints must be filed within 
180 days after the discrimination has occurred, although con­
tinuing forms of discrimination are subject to complaint as 
long as such discrimination continues. Back pay may be awarded 
for up to two years prior to the time the complaint was filed.
One of the major advantages of litigation to complainants 
under Title VII relates to the manner in which a presumption of 
discrimination is raised. Once an employment practice is shown 
to have a differential impact on persons of one sex, the prac­
tice is regarded as suspect, and an employer must then demon­
strate that its effect is related to some factor which is not 
discriminatory. Such practices include the use of tests which 
eliminate a disproportionate number of female applicants and 
job qualifications not reasonably related to job performance 
which have a disparate effect on women.
The part in Title VII of greatest concern to women reads :
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an indi­
vidual , or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's. . . sex. . . or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ­
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
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his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's . . . sex . . . (Oehmke, 1974).
Since the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 amended 
Title VII of the 19 64 Civil Rights Act to cover previously 
exempt employers of educational institutions and state and 
local government employees, all institutions of higher educa­
tion, whether public or private, became subject to the pre­
scriptions placed by Title VII against discrimination on the 
basis of sex in all matters relating to employment.
In addition to Title VII compliance responsibilities, the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) has respon­
sibilities under Executive Order 11,246, which require substan­
tially all government contractors to include in the contract 
provisions an assurance on nondiscrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the terms and 
conditions of employment. The Executive Order also requires 
the contractor to develop and implement an affirmative action 
program. Although the Executive Order is administered by the 
Office of Contract Compliance (OFCC) of the Department of Labor, 
each contracting agency has primary initial responsibility to 
effect compliance with the Order's provision.
The list of Federal legal weapons against employment dis­
crimination always includes Executive Order 11, 246, which 
prohibits discrimination by employers who hold contracts with 
the Federal government. The order originally included race, 
color, religion, and national origin, but not sex, which was 
added to the order in October, 1967, by Executive Order 11,
2 1
375, 3C.F.R. 684. While the Executive Order appears on paper 
to provide substantial leverage against companies which dis­
criminate, it has been largely ineffective (Babcock et al., 
1975). Health, Education and Welfare's recent history of using 
enforcement procedures has been characterized by inordinate 
delays in achieving results. This is due to a reluctance to 
utilize enforcement sanctions.
Under Executive Orders 11,246, 11,375, and Revised Order 
No. 4, employment discrimination by Federal contractors on the 
basis of sex is prohibited. These orders cover contracts for 
$10,0 00 or more. Private contractors whose contracts are for 
$50,000 or more and who have 50 or more employees are required 
to file an affirmative action plan with the Federal government. 
Public institutions have not been required to have a written 
plan until after discrimination charges have been made.
The Department of Labor has primary enforcement responsi­
bility, which delegates the enforcement of its terms to the 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance of the United States 
Department of Labor (OFCC). The OFCC has delegated its power 
to HEW which supervises the compliance of educational insti­
tutions .
Institutions may be required to summarize the distribution 
of faculty personnel by rank, pay, title, longevity of service, 
sex, race, job qualifications, and other employment factors 
which relate to equality of employment opportunity. Affirma­
tive action plans which establish goals and timetables for 
correcting the effects of past discrimination in promotion, 
hiring, and pay may be required.
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Back pay may be awarded to individuals who have not been 
covered by other laws concerning back pay. Complaints must be 
filed within 180 days of the discrimination, but, as in Title 
VII, continuing discrimination was subject to complaint as long 
as it endures. Failure to implement an acceptable affirmative 
action plan may result in cancellation of contracts. The insti­
tution will be asked to comply voluntarily; if this fails, a 
hearing must be held prior to the withdrawal of Federal funds.
To ensure nondiscrimination in employment, contractors 
must take affirmative action in such areas as recruitment and 
advertising; hiring, upgrading, demotion, and transfer; layoff 
or termination; rates pay or other compensation; and selection 
for training, including apprenticeship.
The Labor Department's Office of Federal Contract Compli­
ance (OFCC) which enforces the order, has issued "Sex Discrimi­
nation Guidelines." The guidelines state, among other things, 
that contractors may not advertise under male and female class­
ifications, seniority lists on sex, deny a person a job because 
of state "protective" labor laws, make distinctions betv;een 
married and unmarried persons of one sex only, or penalize 
women in their terms and conditions of employment because they 
require leave for childbearing. The guidelines also specifi­
cally required the granting of a leave of absence to an employee 
for childbearing and reinstatement to her original job or to a 
position of like status and pay without loss of service credits. 
A proposed revision of these guidelines appeared in the Federal 
Register of December 27, 1973.
23
As a step toward arresting and reversing sex discrimination 
in education, women's rights advocates sought a Federal legis­
lative remedy. Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments (see 
Appendix B), enacted by the 92nd Congress, represents the cul­
mination of that search. Title IX, signed on June 28, 19 72, is 
a broad-scale bill covering a range of Federal assistance pro­
grams. Proposed regulations were issued on June 20, 1974, and 
became effective on July 2, 1975.
The key provisions were a broad prohibition against dis­
crimination on the basis of sex in any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance, including 
school districts, their professional and non-professional em­
ployees, and students as well as employees. Congress consciously 
modeled Title IX after Title VI of the 19 64 Civil Rights Act, 
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin in any federally assisted program. Early ver­
sions of Title IX would have added the word "sex" to Title VI, 
but the final product chose instead to place the prohibition in 
a separate law dealing particularly with education. Neverthe­
less, Title VI precedent provides important guidelines for the 
application of Title IX, although the analogy is not perfect, 
since Title IX contains three important exceptions absent in the 
Civil Rights Act. These were exemptions for military schools, 
traditionally one-sex schools, and undergraduate admissions. 
Because the laws diverge at this point, the policies behind 
Title VI precedents must be weighted carefully so that only 
those principles that were truly analogous will be carried over
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from one area to the other (Todd, 1974). Title IX provides 
that with limited exceptions :
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federally financial assis­
tance (20 U.S.C.S. section 1681).
As an agency which extends Federal financial assistance 
for education programs and activities, the HEW was empowered 
under Title IX to issue rules, regulations, and order to effec­
tuate the purposes of the act. Therefore, Title IX was enforced 
by compliance actions initiated by Federal funding agencies. If 
compliance was not obtained through persuasion and conciliation, 
an investigation by the funding agency was made. The institu­
tion was entitled to a hearing to determine whether or not dis­
criminatory practices had occurred. Judicial review was available 
following the hearing. During the review by the agency, the names 
of the complaining parties were kept confidential, if possible.
Title IX has rules that fall into six subparts. Subpart A 
defines terms and includes general matters such as the "assur­
ances" that schools must give HEW, remedial action for past dis­
crimination, and dissemination of information. Coverage of 
institutions and programs were the topic of subpart B. Subpart C 
outlined the prohibitions with regard to admissions and recruit­
ing. Subpart E concerned employment in the education field. 
Finally, subpart F set forth the administrative enforcement pro­
cedures. These regulations were reasonably comprehensive, but
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they included some disappointing omissions, such as a refusal 
to cover sex discrimination in texts and materials, that Title 
IX plaintiffs will be forced to confront.
This law covers pre-schools, elementary and secondary 
schools, institutions of vocational education, professional 
education, and undergraduate and graduate higher education.
Any program receiving Federal financial assistance by way of 
grant, loan, or contract, other than contracts of insurance or 
guaranty was covered.
One of the more well-publicized approaches for combatting 
sex discrimination has been the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. 
The proposed amendment reads as follows ;
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any state on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
of this Article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years 
after the date of ratification.
Certainly the amendment is a step forward, but there is no 
guarantee that it would assure equal rights between the sexes 
any more than ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 
guaranteed equal rights between the races. In fact, one com­
mentator, Professor Freund, had suggested that Congress' power 
under the commerce clause would be more successful in combatting 
sex discrimination than ratification of the Equal Rights
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Amendment. He argues that if the amendment were passed,
statutes would have to be enacted to carry out its purpose
(Miller, 1974). Moreover, Professor Kanowitz points out that 
ratification of the amendment would not render all discrimina­
tory legislation invalid. This statement is especially true 
when one remembers that the United States Supreme Court has 
never interpreted any constitutional amendment as an absolute 
prohibition against regulation, whether the subject is speech, 
press, religion, association, or assembly (Miller, 1974).
There are various forces for and against the Equal Rights
Amendment. On the subject of the Equal Rights Amendment, James
Buckley stated:
I find myself in full agreement with the finding that 
there still exists in our country a discrimination against 
women which cannot be justified and which ought not to be 
tolerated. . . Yet the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
would have the inevitable effect of obliterating all of 
these differentiations. . . (Buckley, 1972, pp. 494-495).
As a proponent, Martha W. Griffiths in her remarks to the House 
of Representatives June 10, 1970 said that the "Equal Rights 
Amendment would establish a clear and unambiguous constitution­
al yardstick for measuring laws which discriminate against half 
of the citizens (Griffiths, 1970, p. 1)."
The American Bar Association Journal summarized the two 
sides of the argument over whether a constitutional amendment 
banning sex discrimination was needed :
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The legal debate on the Equal Rights Amendment has 
revolved around the question of whether the amendment is 
necessary. Opponents have insisted that there is ample 
constitutional authority without the amendment to secure 
equal rights of women...But proponents of the amendment 
have pointed out that judicially condoned classifications 
based on sex still stand in many fields (Bayh, 1972, p. 82). 
It was primarily, though not entirely, the failure of the 
courts to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to sex discrimination 
with the same vigor they had applied it to racial discrimination 
that, in turn, prompted Congress to approve the Equal Rights 
Amendment (Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection, 1971).
After 1923, when the original version (the language of the 
original amendment, changed in 1943, was: "Men and women shall
have equal rights throughout the United States and every place 
subject to its jurisdiction.") was offered to the House Judi­
ciary Committee, the Equal Rights Amendment was introduced in 
Congress every year. However, except in the years 1946, 1950, 
and 1953, little attention was paid to the proposal until the 
1970's.
In the 1920's and 1930's, the Equal Rights Amendment was 
urged as a corollary to the Nineteenth Amendment. In the early 
1940's the Senate Committee on the Judiciary began to report 
the amendment for favorable action on the floor (Brown, 1971).
America's experience in World War II provided strong evi­
dence in the case for the amendment. That war had taken women 
out of the home in far greater numbers than ever before, and
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women had shown they could perform many jobs successfully.
Still, the amendment was debated and defeated on three occas- 
sions between 1946 and 1953 (Babcock, 1975). Beginning in 
1970, heightened effort brought about passage by the Senate 
on March 22, 1972, ending a half-century campaign for congres­
sional enactment of a constitutional guarantee of equal rights 
for men and women (Ross, 1973, p. 24).
Between 1953 and the amendment's next serious consideration 
in 1970, the women's movement, which had subsided after passage 
of the Nineteenth Amendment, again became a serious force in 
American politics. Simone de Beauvoir had published The Second 
Sex in 1949 (Babcock, 1975); it first appeared in the United 
States in 1953; ten years later, Betty Friedan's book. The 
Feminine Mystique, appeared (Astin, 1975). "President Kennedy 
appointed the first Commission on the Status of Women in 1961, 
and in 19 66 the National Organization for Women (NOW) was 
founded "(Kanowitz, 1972, p. 203).
Decrow states, "Women have [fared] miserably under the 
law, not only in the decisions which are against us, but even 
in the cases that went 'for' us, and we are deluding ourselves 
if we think that women can get justice in the courts" (19 74, 
p. 1). Fortunately, progress has been made in the area of fair 
employment practices. Equity, as well as Federal legislation, 
demands that a policy of nondiscrimination be maintained in 
employment practices (Steinback & Reback, 1974). Although 
courts seem very reluctant in making decisions regarding sex 
discrimination, it can be said that there are no hard and fast 
answers in this area of the law.
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Sex discrimination can and does limit employment 
opportunities for women. Institutions of learning are over­
looking an invaluable asset to their programs. Talented and 
qualified women are being detoured to lesser positions 
which discourages advancement. Therefore, it is necessary 
to know where and how these practices exist so that change can 
occur.
CHAPTER III 
FINDINGS
Doris L. Sassower (1972) stated:
Time was when women, like children, were seen and not 
heard. But the times are indeed "a changing" for women 
and children! Women have become vocal, and not only aware 
of their rights, but ready to assert them, and what's more, 
they are demanding that rights be created where the law 
failed to recognize them. Whether the thought of women 
poised as litigants ready to do combat against an academic 
institutional adversary is frightening to educators or not, 
such confrontations have been increasing with dramatic fre­
quency in the past few years. The pressure of organized 
women has brought forth new remedies and, thus, New Rights 
to deal with old grievances now irrefutably come to light 
(p. 29).
Recent court decisions, together with new and amended leg­
islation, have created new methods to eradicate sex discrimina­
tion in education. The impact of the new and changed legislation 
has hardly begun to be felt in education. It will bring about 
significant changes from kindergarten through the graduate 
school. Discrimination in education on the basis of sex begins
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with the denial of equal educational opportunities and extends 
to denial of equal employment opportunities and related bene­
fits (Hallam, 1973),
As stated numerous times, employment discrimination based 
on sex is unlawful, but it still occurs. "The EEOC received 
33,948 complaints during fiscal 1973 alone. Of these, 15,719 
were from women, but not necessarily because of sex discrimina­
tion" (Blackey, 1974, p. 13). Many victims of discrimination 
are unaware of what they can do. Some accept discrimination for 
fear of reprisal or because relief is expensive and time consum­
ing. Employment discrimination is perhaps the clearest example 
of the adverse effects of sex discrimination. The various 
phases of employment discussed within this paper include promo­
tion and tenure, appointment, dismissal and pregnancy, all of 
which are subject to some form of discrimination.
Promotion and Tenure 
Tenure was expressed by Arthur P . Manare in the Journal 
of College and University Law;
The purpose of tenure is principally to preserve academic 
freedom. This is to say, tenure is designed to safeguard 
the teacher from dismissal for arbitrary or invidious 
reasons, and so protects and preserves the freedom of 
inquiry and freedom of expression which are desirable to 
an academic community. To most people, tenure probably 
connotes job security. What it actually confers is the 
right to a specified grievance procedure. The "right" 
to continued employment embodied in tenure is of little
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worth without these procedural protections; and what 
distinguishes the status of a tenured from that of a non­
tenured professor is primarily this right to procedural 
safeguards in case of termination (1975, p.256).
In regard to legislation, it is a violation of both Title 
VII, 42 U.S.C. section 2000 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
administered by the EEOC, and Executive Order, administered by 
the OFCC, for Federal contractors to deny equal opportunity 
for promotion. Under both, employers must recruit, train, and 
promote persons in all job classifications without regard to 
sex, race, color, religion, or national origin. They must in­
sure that promotion decisions are in accord with principles of 
equal employment opportunity by imposing only valid require­
ments for promotion opportunities. Under the affirmative action 
plan outlined in Revised Order No. 4, employers are required to 
set goals and time-tables for promoting women (Terlin, 1975).
An assistant professor brought action, on her own behalf 
and on behalf of other women employed by the university in 
professional positions, against the University and its chancel­
lor, alleging discrimination against women. Dr. Ina Braden was 
employed by the corporate defendant. University of Pittsburgh, 
as an assistant professor in the Learning Resources Division 
of the University's Dental School.
Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, No. 72-1220, 477 F .2d 
1 (3rd Cir. 1972), alleged that the defendants had enacted and 
effected policies and practices of unlawful and systematic ex­
clusion of and discrimination against women by hiring them at
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lower rank and lesser pay than similarly trained and qualified 
men, failing to promote women as they promoted men, and failing 
to grant tenure as was granted to men.
The United States District Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania, Herbert P. Sorg, J., dismissed the complaint. 
The Court of Appeals held that judgment dismissing action could 
not be sustained in light of deficiencies in the record as to 
number of trustees selected by the state and sums of money con­
tributed by the state to the University. The complaint was 
dismissed.
A case involving promotion of women in educational insti­
tutions was Green v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech University, 
No. 72-1542, 474 F .2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973). The case was a 
civil rights action by Lola Beth Green, associate professor, 
seeking redress for grievance allegedly resulting from sex 
discrimination by university officials.
Ms. Green was an associate professor of English at Texas 
Tech University and had been teaching in the English Department 
of that University for almost 25 years. She began at the rank 
of instructor in 1946, received her doctorate in 1955, was 
promoted to assistant professor in that same year, and was 
promoted to the rank of associate professor in 1959. Beginning 
in 19 62, she had applied periodically for promotion to full 
professor and had been denied each time. She alleged that 
these denials were based solely on the fact that she was female 
and that such action on the part of Texas Tech University 
exemplified the long-standing pattern and policy of the
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University of discrimination against women. The suit resulted 
from the denial of her 19 69 application for promotion.
Lola Beth Green introduced evidence of her professional 
competence and achievements, as well as those of her male 
colleagues in the English Department who had been granted the 
rank of full professor. She also produced statistical evidence 
to support the allegations of a pattern of discrimination against 
women in the hiring, salary, and promotion practices of the 
English Department.
The overwhelming evidence, decided by the Court, was that 
the decision not to promote M s . Green was based entirely on 
considerations other than that of her sex and was completely 
uninfluenced by the fact that she was a woman. Texas Tech 
University had established definite criteria for evaluating a 
person's eligibility for promotion in teaching rank. The Court 
found that these criteria were reasonable, they bore a rational 
relationship to the duties of a full professor, and they were 
reasonably applied in this case.
Each of the defendants' witnesses testified that the de­
cision not to promote was based solely on the facts of Ms .
Green's record, with no thought given to her sex. Therefore, 
the Court found no evidence that the denial of her promotion 
was based on sex discrimination or on any other constitutionally 
prohibited grounds, but was, in fact, based solely on the evi­
dence considered by the proper authorities as to her qualifica­
tions under the established criteria for such a promotion. A 
judgment was entered by the Court denying plaintiff all relief 
and taxing costs against plaintiff.
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Women who believe they have met discrimination in employ­
ment are increasingly turning to state anti-discrimination 
agencies, as well as federal agencies, for relief. In EEOC v. 
Tufts Institution of Learning, 10 EPD 6365 (1973), there were 
indications that two females were denied promotion and tenure 
because of their sex. They both seemed to be qualified for pro­
motion and tenure, and further evidence indicated that the 
chairman of the subcommittee selected to rule on their tenure 
had demonstrated a sex-biased attitude.
This action was handled by the EEOC for relief from alleged 
discriminatory employment practices based upon sex, which were 
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended. The EEOC sought relief against Tufts to redress 
alleged discriminatory acts involving the discharges of 
Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier and Barbara E. White, former em­
ployment practices and policies.
Joost resided in Newton, Massachusetts. She was first 
employed by Tufts as a part-time lecturer in 19 67 in the Fine 
Arts Department and served in that position for two years.
During that period she was also part-time lecturer at Newton 
College. In 1969, she was employed full time by Tufts in the 
department with the rank of assistant professor. Tufts not­
ified her on August 21, 1972, that her contract of employment 
would not be renewed at the expiration of the 1972-73 academic 
year.
White resided in Lexington, Massachusetts. She was first 
employed by Tufts in 19 65 with the rank of lecturer-teacher in
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art history and employed as assistant professor in the depart­
ment during the academic years beginning September, 1966 to 
August, 1973. In January, 1972, White was informed that the 
tenure committee had decided not to recommend her for promotion 
to the rank of associate professor and for tenure. She was 
notified by Tufts on May 4, 1972, that her contract of employ­
ment would not be renewed at the expiration of the 1972-73 
academic year.
The Court concluded that there was no showing of sex dis­
crimination that would warrant preliminary relief to a female 
faculty member in being denied reappointment when both plaintiffs 
were evaluated on the basis of quality of mind, intellectual 
force, scholarship, teaching effectiveness, and contributions 
to University objectives.
Most cases dealing with promotion involve the question of 
tenure. An example of this was Johnson v. University of Pitts­
burgh , No. 73-120, 359 F.Supp. 1002 (W.D.Pa. 1973). Sharon L. 
Johnson was denied tenure and a promotion, allegedly for de­
ficiencies in her teaching. Dr. Johnson filed an EEOC complaint, 
received a right to sue letter from EEOC, and, subsequently, 
filed her Title VII suit. This action by an untenured assist­
ant professor against the University and officials of the Uni­
versity was on the grounds that she was to be discharged because 
of her sex.
Ms. Johnson had been employed in 1967 for three years as 
assistant professor without tenure in the Department of Bio­
chemistry of the School Medicine at the University of Pittsburgh
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at a salary of $13,000 per year. At the time of her employment, 
she was advised by the Chairman of the Biochemistry Department 
that the requirements for securing tenure within six years 
were research and membership in the American Society of Biolog­
ical Chemists. During her employment at the University of 
Pittsburgh, Dr. Johnson did attain membership in the American 
Society of Biological Chemists ; attained professional stature; 
published independent research of high quality; was active in 
other contributions; and fulfilled her teaching requirements 
in a fashion that was not criticized prior to 1971.
On October 27, 1971, it was decided not to grant Dr.
Johnson tenure. This decision was based primarily on the 
committee's finding that her teaching was inadequate. She was 
first notified that her employment would be terminated on 
January 6, 1972, in a conversation with the chairman of the 
department.
In issuing the injunction, the judge noted that "evidence 
established a reasonable probability of plaintiff's success 
on the merits":
The Title VII suit makes a prima facie case for inten­
tional discrimination, using such evidence as statistical 
proof of discrimination (in the School of Medicine, de­
spite the fact that over a six-year-period many women 
were eligible for tenure, 70 men were given that status 
as compared to three women), the differential treatment 
of a male professor who was granted tenure, although he 
had much the same evaluations that she had as lecturer;
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the raises given men regardless of their tenure in the 
Biochemistry Department for the years 1967-1972 that were 
higher than those given Johnson: the failure of the Medi­
cal School to take substantial steps to increase the 
number of faculty women, despite its affirmative action 
program (Sinowit, 1974, p. 62).
The court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the Uni­
versity from discharging Sharon Johnson or denying her tenure.
The use of Title VII dealing with promotions can also be 
found in Rackin v. University of Pennsylvania, No. 73-1007, 386 
F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Dr. Phyllis Rackin, professor at 
the University of Pennsylvania, brought an action against the 
University, its various officers, and certain tenured members 
Of the University's English department, for redress of alleged 
discrimination against her in the terms and conditions of her 
employment solely on the basis of her sex.
Essentially the complaint alleged that in 1962 Dr. Rackin, 
who had earned a Ph.D. in English, was appointed as fully 
affiliated instructor in the English Department of the Univer­
sity. She was promoted in June, 19 64, to a fully-affiliated 
assistant professor of English for a three-year term. Subse­
quently, Dr. Rackin, believing her credentials sufficient, 
applied for promotion and tenure within the department. Under 
circumstances which deviated from normal procedure within the 
University, her application was denied despite two votes of 
approval by the tenured members of the English Department.
Dr. Rackin alleged that the defendants had violated her rights
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under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, amended on 
March 24, 1972.
The case was dismissed. However, in 1974, the University 
of Pennsylvania offered Dr. Phyllis Rackin the sum of $70,000 
in partial settlement of the suit she had brought against the 
University in 1973. Dr. Rackin charged that she had been denied 
tenure because of her sex, and that she had been receiving 
$7,000 less in annual pay than her male colleagues doing the 
same work. The University claimed that the $70,000 was solely 
for application to Dr. Rackin's legal expenses, and that it 
did not constitute an admission of guilt. The University also 
denied a report that it had spent $400,000 fighting the suit 
(Sandler, 1975, p. 2).
Still another case which based its defense on Title VII 
was Calage v. The University of Tennessee in 1975. Cleo Calage 
brought an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
19 64 alleging that the plaintiff was unlawfully discriminated 
against because of her sex while employed by the University of 
Tennessee Food Service Department. She claimed that her treat­
ment by the University was discriminatory in the following 
respects :
1. The University failed to grant her promotion during
her employment because of her sex.
2. The University failed to pay her the same wages for
the same work performed by males.
3. The University unlawfully maintained sex-based job 
classifications.
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4. The University unlawfully discriminated against her 
in regard to certain fringe benefits.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC on February 27, 1973, 
and received a right to sue letter on October 4, 1974.
In the fall of 1966, a male manager of catering was hired 
and in 1968 ,transferred, creating a vacancy in the catering 
position, which Cleo Calage assumed. She contended that in 
1968, she, in fact, if not in title, assumed the former position 
of manager of catering, for which she should have been paid an 
equal salary of $8,200 instead of the $5,800 that she received.
The Court held that any wage difference between Calage and 
males and her lack of promotion was founded entirely on factors 
other than her sex. The Court was also of the opinion that she 
was not the object of unlawful discrimination under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act (Calage v. The University of Tennessee, 
No. 3-75-1, 400 F. Supp. 32, (D.Tenn. 1975).
Another case, Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology,
No. 74-1930, 524 F.2d 818, (7th Cir. 1975), which dealt with 
promotion and tenure, brought a Civil Rights Act suit against 
the University and others to recover for alleged sex-based 
discrimination against female faculty. For five years, com­
mencing in the fall of 1966, Dr. Cohen served as an assistant 
professor in the Department of Psychology and Education of the 
Illinois Institute of Technology. In March of 1969, and in 
1970 and 1971 as well, the head of her department recommended 
that she be promoted to associate professor, a tenured position, 
but in each of these years the recommendation was denied for
4 1
no stated reason. She alleged that each denial was in fact 
based solely on Dr. Cohen's being a woman. In March of 1971, 
the President advised Dr. Cohen that she would not be offered 
a tenured appointment, and therefore the ensuing year would be 
her last.
Unwilling to continue in an untenured status, Cohen re­
signed and requested a statement of reasons for refusing to 
grant her tenure. The chairman of her department responded that 
he "frankly did not know."
In August of 1971, Cohen filed a complaint with the De­
partment of Health, Education and Welfare. After an investi­
gation, the Regional Civil Rights Director reported that there 
was reasonable cause to conclude that Dr. Cohen was discrimina­
ted against because of her sex by the Institute when she was 
paid less than the average salary of similarly situated males, 
and that she was terminated in part because of her sex.
The United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois dismissed the complaint, and the plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The next case to be discussed in this section was Byron 
V .  University of Florida, No. 75-15, 403, F.Supp. 49 (D. Fla. 
1975). Billie H. Byron brought an action against the University 
and various individuals as its agents, claiming that they had 
been guilty of sex discrimination against her in connection 
with her employment.
The complaint alleged that Bryon was denied promotion 
from a position of Staff Assistant II to that of Staff Assistant
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I and that she was finally demoted to a position of Secretary 
III. Byron also charged that she was given unsatisfactory job 
ratings for disloyalty, denied access to her personnel file, 
and was reassigned to another department where her prospects 
for advancement were curtailed. The complaint alleged that she 
filed charges with the EEOC and subsequently received a notice 
of right to sue. Billie Byron was seeking reinstatement as a 
Staff Assistant I, other injunctive relief, and back pay. The 
District Court held that the suit against the University for 
back pay was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The action was 
dismissed as to the University; in other respects, the motion 
to dismiss was denied.
The most recent case involving tenure was Pillion v.
Board of Education of Pearl River School District, 51, A.D.2d 
967 (App. Div. N.Y. 1976). Alicia Pillion, a tenured teacher, 
was formally placed on suspension on September 4, 1973, pend­
ing a determination of charges preferred against her by the 
Board to the effect that she had been excessively absent and 
that her physical condition, including one instance of intoxi­
cation, had interfered with the performance of her duties. 
Statutory hearing on the charges was held by the commissioner's 
hearing panel. It was determined that Pillion would remain on 
suspension until the completion of medical and psychological 
examinations to determine whether she was physically and psy­
chologically capable of resuming her teaching responsibilities, 
and whether she had solved her problem relating to alcoholism. If she was 
found to be fit for duty after these examinations, she would
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be returned to teaching duty at the beginning of the 197 4 spring 
semester. She passed the required medical and psychological 
examinations and sought back pay for the suspension period, 
September 4, 1973 to February 4, 1974. Although petitioner, as 
a tenured teacher, was entitled to back pay until the time of 
the determination of the charges preferred against her, the 
court ruled that she could not recover any back pay for the 
period of her suspension following the determination of her un­
fitness for duty.
In conclusion, these cases related to the implementation 
of tenure and promotion involving women in higher education.
The only exception was in the case of Pillion v. Board of Ed­
ucation which dealt with the administrative process of the 
public schools. Tenure and promotion seemed easier to attain 
in the public schools than in colleges and universities.
Discrimination, a term with numerous connotations, has a 
stigma of being an unwanted or unwarranted act. The courts 
have a reluctance to interfere with educational matters, espe­
cially steering away from a question of discrimination when it 
lies between a value judgment and the act itself. Since it 
was hard to define the term, even when presented in charges 
as in promotion and tenure, the courts tried to avoid the topic 
altogether.
In dealing with promotion and tenure, women were usually 
not told with any clarity that they would not be approved.
Women in several cases were not given reasons as to why they 
would not be accepted (Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh and
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Calage v. The University of Tennessee). Women did not give 
up the pursuit of receiving tenure but tried countless times 
for tenure even with forces working against them (Green v.
Board of Regents and Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology).
Within these cases, courts were unable to provide a solu­
tion to many discriminatory problems because of their inability 
to change the traditional attitudes of employers regarding 
women. Recent research revealed that women were pursuing 
advanced educational training with a desire to apply and seek 
higher-level positions (Schmuch, 1975) . Since the qualifica­
tions of women are increasing, promoting women will become an 
easier task. Nevertheless, the perplexities experienced by 
women desiring and deserving tenure and promotion were growing 
ones.
Appointment
Discrimination in education on the basis of sex began with 
the denial of equal educational opportunities and extended to 
the denial of equal employment opportunities and related bene­
fits (Hallam, 1973). Equal opportunity has become front-page 
news in recent years, as many women question their roles in 
public and private activities. Nowhere do the far-ranging aspects 
of this equality have more impact than in the labor force and 
especially in the education job market (Hall, 1973). The ele­
vation of the role of women in the labor market drew more atten­
tion when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed. Title VII 
of this act prohibited discrimination in employment on the basis 
of sex. Over the years since the Civil Rights Act was passed.
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numerous suits have been brought by women, or civil rights 
agencies on their behalf, charging employers and institutions 
with discrimination. Some decisions stated that, though dis­
crimination was not intended, the employment practice in an 
institution resulted in an unequal pay or promotion treatment 
for women employees.
A flood of new administrative memos and guidelines has 
changed the ground rules. But new laws and efforts by employ­
ers will not make equal opportunity a fact if society's views 
about women's potential remain. The following cases dealt 
with discrimination in regards to the appointment of women.
The first case in this area was Pace College v. Commission 
on Human Rights of the City of New York and Valentine R.
Winsey, No. 17011, 5 FEP 77, (Sup. Ct. N.Y.1972). The peti­
tioner (Pace) was an institution of higher education incor­
porated by charters granted by the Board of Regents of the 
State of New York.
Winsey had been an associate professor at Pace. In Feb­
ruary, 1970, instead of being promoted to full professor, she 
was given a contract for the next academic year, 1970-1971, 
with a notice that it was a terminal one. She refused to 
accept the contract and resigned. Later, she attempted to 
rescind her resignation, but Pace refused, apparently because 
other teachers had been hired to handle her courses. At this 
time, she made a complaint to the Commission that she had been 
discriminated against because of her sex.
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Four hearings were held before two Commissioners in 
December, 1971 to April, 1972. On July 3, 1972, the Commis­
sion made its decision and gave its order, which was served 
July 6, 1972. The Commission found that members of the 
: faculty at Pace had hostile attitudes toward women, that Winsey 
was': terminated because of her sex, that petitioner discrimi­
nated against women in hiring, promotion, and termination, and 
that Winsey's employment was terminated by an act of the peti­
tioner. The Commission went on to direct Pace to reinstate 
petitioner and order an affirmative action program with respect 
to women and Pace College. The Court reviewed the minutes of 
the hearings held before the Commission and found that the 
conclusions arrived at by the Commission and its subsequent 
directions were arbitrary, and not supported by the evidence.
The Commission admitted that Winsey was initially hired 
at a position higher than that for which she was qualified and 
was insisting upon promotion to a position to which she ad­
mittedly was not qualified. Also, she was paid more than most 
of the men in her department holding the same title.
In the Court's summary, it was stated that the Court was 
mindful of the fact that respondents had shown sufficient evi­
dence to indicate that women were definitely in a minority at 
Pace and that some members of the faculty might be hesitant to 
hire women. But there was insufficient evidence to show that 
Pace practiced any kind of intentional discrimination against 
women in its personnel practices or that Winsey was terminated
47
solely because of sex. The Court also stated to Ms. Winsey 
personally that she had received far better treatment than most 
men.
The Court also stated that they were mindful of, and 
appreciated the effects of, the Commission in trying to right 
the wrongs of centuries, but the record did not support the 
conclusions arrived by the Commission and the harsh directions 
that the petitioner received as a result. The Court granted 
petitioner's application and denied the cross-applications of 
the respondents.
Another action dealing with the appointment of women was 
League of Academic Women v. Regents of the University of 
California, No. C-72-265, 343 F. Supp. 636 (D.Ct.,Cali.1972). 
This case pursued declaratory and injunctive relief against 
regents of the University of California to prevent them from 
continuing to discriminate in hiring and employment on the 
basis of sex.
The plaintiffs in this action were the League of Academic 
Women, twelve individual plaintiffs, and the class of women 
which they sought to represent. The League of Academic Women 
was a common-law association of women employees and women 
students at the Berkeley complex. Of the twelve individual 
plaintiffs, three were members of the academic staff at the 
Berkeley complex, one was a former academic employee, five were 
currently employed on the nonacademic staff, and three were 
presently enrolled as graduate students and were potential em­
ployees of the University. The class which these plaintiffs
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were seeking to represent was composed of all women presently 
employed, or employed at some time during the past five years, 
at the Berkeley complex, and all women qualified for such 
employment. Named as defendants in this action were the Regents 
of the University of California.
Plaintiffs attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
Court, to secure the protection, and redress the deprivation of 
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and section eighteen of the California Constitution. 
The first cause of action alleged was that the policies and 
practices of defendants denied to women an equal right to make 
and enforce employment contracts as was enjoyed by white male 
citizens. The question in mind dealt with the interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The challenge, brought against the 
rights of these individuals, was whether the Amendment implied 
white citizens or white males. Some cases applied the amend­
ment solely to cases of racial discrimination.
The second complaint was that defendants had denied women 
an equal protection of the laws and equal access to public em­
ployment. The third complaint was that the University had 
denied them equal protection of the law of the California Con­
stitution.
In judgment given defendants' motion to dismiss, the 
District Court held that the civil rights statute provides that 
all persons within jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every state to make and enforce contracts as 
was enjoyed by white citizens. Therefore, it does not apply to 
sex discrimination claims.
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In 1974, Janet Jackson Keller brought action for alleged 
sex discrimination charges against a University in regard to 
compensation, terms, conditions, and opportunities for employ­
ment in Keller v. University of Michigan, No. 74-72182, 411 F. 
Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1974). There was a question by the 
District Court whether the University was a "person" within the 
civil rights statute or an agency of state so as to be immune 
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
By neglect, Janet Jackson Keller failed to file all of the 
charges against defendants with the EEOC. Those that were not 
filed were dismissed, but the motion which was seeking to dis­
miss plaintiff's claim for punitive damages was denied without 
prejudice.
A female teacher, whose husband was employed by the same 
College in which she sought employment, was denied term appoint­
ment on the basis of sexually discriminatory application of a 
nepotism rule in Sanbonmatsu v. Boyer, 45 A.D. 2d (App.N.Y.
197 4). Dr. Joan Sanbonmatsu and her husband Dr. Akira 
Sanbonmatsu were speech professors. They found that teaching 
at the same institution was desirable and convenient. The so- 
called nepotism rule of the University prohibited the appoint­
ment of parent, child, brother, sister, husband or wife to be 
a member of the academic or nonacademic staff. Appellant's 
husband had been a member of the staff since 1964. Because of 
that fact, she had been denied a "term" appointment to the staff 
since her marriage, although she had been employed regularly on 
a "temporary" appointment. Appellant contended that the nepotism
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rule was discriminatory and that the decision of Brown, Presi­
dent of the College, denying her a term appointment for the 
year 19 69-1970 was arbitrary and illegal.
After administrative hearings and appeals, Joan Sanbonmatsu 
submitted the issue to the Courts. Dr. Sanbonmatsu had become 
associated with the University as an assistant professor when 
she was given a "term" appointment in 19 63. She resigned that 
appointment when she planned to marry Dr. Akira Sanbonmatsu.
The College had hired her by "temporary" appointments for a 
period of five and one-half years. She requested a term appoint­
ment and was refused by Brown. Instead, she was given a tempo­
rary appointment which denied her of fringe benefits and tenure 
rights. February, 1970, she applied for maternity leave of 
absence for the fall semester of 1970, which was a benefit 
accorded to term appointees. She was immediately terminated 
from her position.
The decision to deny appellant a term appointment for the 
year 1969-1970 was arbitrary because it was based upon the 
application of an unlawful discriminatory rule. Judgment 
entered reinstatement of Dr. Joan Sanbonmatsu as a member of 
the staff of State University College with a term appointment.
When an individual does not file a charge with the EEOC, 
a suit usually cannot be made against an employer under Title 
VII. An example of this type of case was Johnson v. Board of 
Education of the City of Fargo, No. A3-74-20, 12FEP 997 (D.N.D. 
1975). Ms. Johnson stated two claims. Her first claim was 
that the Board discriminated against her on the basis of sex by
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failing to hire her either as a full-time teacher during the 
academic year 1971-1972, or as a full-time teacher during the 
year 1972-1973. Her second claim was that the Board failed 
to give her notice of contemplation of nonrenewal of her con­
tract and of her right to a meeting which deprived her of sub­
stantive and procedural due process of law.
Susan Johnson had been hired as a social studies teacher at 
South High School on a part-time contract designated as a part- 
time position. She was advised by letter that she would not at 
that time be offered employment for the 1971-1972 school year, 
but if she wished to be considered for either a part-time or 
full-time contract for 1971-1972, she should notify the person­
nel office. She was offered a part-time position for the 19 71- 
1972 school year.
On April 14, 1972, she was advised by letter that she 
would not be offered employment for the 1972-1973 school year, 
but that if she wished to be considered for a part-time or full­
time position, she should submit a written notice to the office. 
She was not informed that she could appear before the School 
Board to discuss the reasons for not being rehired and she did 
not request an appearance with the School Board. At both times 
that she was in question for a position, men were hired for 
full-time appointments.
The question of this case was whether the School Board 
was required by law to give her a preliminary notice of con­
templated nonrenewal with a notice of right to appear before 
the School Board prior to the "final decision" for discussion
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of the reasons for the contemplated nonrenewal. Since she had 
sent a letter requesting full-time employment, she abandoned 
any possible right to be rehired as a part-time teacher under 
the same terms and conditions as the contract for the current 
year. The judgment was for a dismissal of action.
A case involving one former female University instructor, 
and one female whose application for teaching position had been 
denied was Weise and Mortenson v. Syracuse University, Nos.
372, 383, 522 F.2d 897 (2nd Cir. 1975). Two women, Selene 
Weise and Jo Davis Mortenson, brought separate actions against 
a private University and some of its officials.
In 1969, Ms. Weise applied for a position as lecturer in 
the Department of Public Address at Syracuse University. She 
was denied the position in favor of an allegedly less qualified 
male. In January of 1970, she requested consideration for a 
teaching assistantship for the academic year 1970-1971. Al­
though Weise was hired for this position in March, 1970, she 
filed charges in reference to the Human Rights Law of New York 
alleging sex discrimination in the denial of her application 
for the lecturer's position. On December 14, 1970, seven days 
after the hearing of the charges, she was notified that her 
appointment as teaching assistant would be terminated at the 
end of the academic year. Sensing that this was no mere coin­
cidence, Weise filed an additional charge, this time alleging 
retaliation. These complaints were dismissed by the State 
Division of Human Rights on April 21, 1972, and Weise's appeals 
were dismissed by the Division's Appeal Board on June 1, 1973.
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She also filed, charges with the EEOC on May 8, 1972. On June 
28, 1973, the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue.
Mortenson, who had a Ph.D. in English, was employed as an 
assistant professor in Syracuse's Department of English from 
1956-1968, during which time she taught lower and upper level 
undergraduate courses. According to the complaint, when de­
fendant Bryant became chairman of the department in 1968, he 
gave her less desirable assignments in terms of courses and 
scheduling while assigning less well qualified males to teach 
more desirable classes. In the fall of 1969, the tenured staff 
of the English Department met to consider the prospects for 
tenure of Ms. Mortenson and three male faculty mem.bers, which 
included Peter Mortenson, who was soon to become the plaintiff's 
husband. Peter Mortenson and Donald Morton were advised that 
they would be recommended to tenure; Mortenson and Joseph Roesch 
were told that they would be terminated in June, 1971. In the 
fall of 1970, Roesch's position was extended until June, 1972, 
and Ms. Mortenson was told by a tenured professor that Roesch's 
extension was granted because he was married and at that time 
he was unable to find desirable employment. Ms. Mortenson's 
appointment was terminated as scheduled.
After filing several local complaints, Ms. Mortenson on 
September 24, 1973, filed a complaint with the EEOC in Buffalo, 
alleging that her termination of employment was in violation of 
Title VII. The complaint was dismissed because it was untimely 
filed. On December 7, Mortenson filed her complaint in the 
district court.
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The District Court for the Northern District of New York, 
James T. Foley, Chief Judge, dismissed both complaints and the 
women appealed and the appeals were consolidated. The Court 
of Appeals, J. Joseph Smith, Circuit Judge, held that evidence 
was insufficient to permit determination of existence of state 
action.
In Stevens v. Junior College District of St. Louis, St. 
Louis County Missouri, No. 75-151C(4), 410 F.Supp. 309 (D.Mo. 
197 6) , a black female employee of a Junior College district 
brought civil rights suit alleging discrimination on the basis 
of race and retaliatory conduct on the part of defendant for 
plaintiff's filing of complaints of discrimination.
Agnes E. Stevens brought this action under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 19 64. The case was tried before the 
Court without a jury. The Court considered the pleadings, the 
testimony of the witnesses, and documents in evidence, and the 
stipulations of the parties, made the following statement:
The Court found that plaintiff was transferred solely 
because of her poor performance, use of profane language, 
and offensive personal habits. The Court has further 
found that these same considerations were the sole reasons 
for her discharge. Ms. Stevens was not discriminated 
against on account of her race, not in retaliation for 
filing charges with the EEOC. Therefore, Title VII had 
not been violated.
The second category dealt with appointments. In the realm 
of equal opportunities for women in employment. Miller stated:
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The role the courts can play in achieving equal status 
between the sexes must be kept in perspective, for the 
judiciary can only achieve legal equality. The greater 
task which lies beyond the achievement of legal equality 
involves a socialization process for both men and women 
which consists of rethinking the roles and stature of 
men and women in modern society as well as educating \ 
people in the wisdom and benefit of basic human equality. 
The legal struggle is crucial for it is the first step 
... (1974, pp. 82-83).
One of the more interesting cases was Sanonmatsu v. Boyer. 
In this case, the courts found the nepotism rule to be discrimin­
atory. An interesting note was that the administrators were 
willing to bypass the ruling and allow Dr. Joan Sanbonmatsu to 
work, but others were reluctant to change the system.
Women were not given reasons why they were not appointed, 
as in tenure and promotion discrimination (Johnson v. Board of 
Education of the City of Fargo and Weise and Mortenson v. 
Syracuse University). Within these same cases, women were need­
lessly turned down for positions because their competitors v^ere 
male applicants. Since men are looked upon as the breadwinners 
of the family, they were sometimes hired over more qualified 
women.
This paper did not deal exclusively with sex discrimination 
but with the problem of job discrimination. Therefore, discrim­
ination on the basis of race was an acceptable topic. Women 
who have been denied appointment due to race and sex
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discrimination have tested the courts to decide if discrimination 
existed within an institution (Stevens v. Junior College District 
of St. Louis). Courts have difficulty in deliberating a decision 
when both sex and race discrimination were involved. The sex of 
an individual has a greater effect than race on one's appointment 
according to this particular ruling.
Dismissal
An individual's sex is or should be irrelevant to his or 
her potential to contribute to a position (Buek and Orleans,
1973). This idea was in Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972);
Since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, 
the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of 
a particular sex because of their sex would seen to violate 
"the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should 
bear some relationship to individual responsibility..." 
Frequently, women felt that the termination of positions 
occurred because of their sex. Many have gone to court for 
relief and many have not. Most of the litigation researched in­
volved the question of dismissal. The following court cases 
dealt with the topic of dismissal in relation to women in educa­
tional institutions.
In Jones v. School District of Borough of Kulpmont, 3 A.2d 
(Sup. Ct., 1939), Ms. Jones, after nine years as teacher in the 
Kulpmont first grade, was elected to be the sole "permanent 
supply teacher" in the district, commencing September, 1936.
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Her duty was to act as full-time substitute in all elementary 
grades and kindergarten- In May, 1938, she was notified of 
a resolution of the Board discontinuing the permanent supply 
position and suspending Ms. Jones until its reestablishment.
Upon appeal, the Court found that her contract was within the 
Tenure Act, that the elimination of the position was for the 
purpose of dismissing Margaret R. Jones as a nonresident, and 
that no grounds appeared for discontinuing her employment.
From the order of reinstatement, the school district appealed. 
The School Board stated that Ms. Jones was not a "professional 
supply teacher" and that she clearly does not fall within the 
clause of any regular full-time employee certified as a teacher.
In the absence of a specific constitutional or statutory 
provision, or a valid regulation on the part of the employing 
body, there were no general requirements in the law that public 
employees reside within the territory of the governmental body 
employing them, although the School Board may adopt such 
rules in order to manage its affairs. But since there was 
nothing in the record to show that the School Board made any 
such regulation as a matter of general school policy, the mere 
fact of non-residence would not warrant the Board's action.
The order was affirmed at the school's cost.
Even in the past, society's concept of educators was one 
of idealistic morality as in the case of Horosko v. School 
District of Mount Pleasant Township, 6 A.2d 866 (Sup. Ct.,
1939). The case was an appeal from an order of the Superior
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Court reversing an order of the Common Pleas which had affirmed 
the action of a School Board in discharging a teacher. On her 
appeal to the Common Pleas the teacher requested and obtained a 
hearing. The difference of view between the two courts which 
had considered the case arises from a different interpretation 
of the following which can terminate the teacher because of 
immorality, incompetency, intemperance, cruelty, willful and 
persistent negligence, mental derangement, persistent and will­
ful violation of the school laws of this Commonwealth.
The members of the court agreed that the Superior Court was 
much narrower than was apparently intended by the legislature. 
The Superior Court had stated:
It has always been the recognized duty of the teacher to 
conduct himself in such way as to command the respect and 
good will of the community, though one result of the 
choice of a teacher's vocation may be to deprive him of 
the same freedom of action enjoyed by persons in other 
vocations (Horosko v. School District).
Difficulties between this teacher and the Board had existed 
for some time because of her conduct with respect to a restaur­
ant maintained by a man whom she married in August, 1936. In 
this restaurant, beer was sold, a pin-ball and a slot machine 
were maintained, and dice were played. The restaurant was 
across the road and about 125 feet from the school.
Evelyn Horosko acted as waitress and, on occasion, as bar­
tender, with such services being performed after school hours 
and during the summer vacation. She was accused of taking an
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occasional drink of beer, serving beer to customers, shaking 
dice with customers for drinks and playing a pin-ball machine 
on the premises. Some of this occurred in front of some 
students she was tutoring. Furthermore, she was rated by 
A.H. Howell, County Superintendent of Schools, as 43% competent, 
in which 50% was passing or average rating.
There was in the case of Horosko v. School District a 
difference of opinion in the definition of "incompetency."
The opinion of the Superior Court based its definition on a 
narrower construction of "competency." The Supreme Court 
questioned whether competency was merely the ability to teach 
the "Three R's." The Court decided that the provisions of the 
clause which included the words "incompetency" and "immorality" 
are therefore to be construed according to their common and 
approved usage.
Definitions of "immorality" include conduct inconsistent 
with moral rectitude. A  large body of public opinion regarded 
gambling as immoral. Furthermore, gambling with a pin-ball or 
a slot machine, or with dice was prohibited by law.
The Superior Court concluded that the order made in the 
Common Pleas was "just," and that each party was to bear its 
own costs. Therefore, the action of the School Board in dis­
charging Evelyn Horosko was agreed upon by the higher court.
A problem of dismissing faculty members in schools occurs 
when the population of pupils decreased. This particular problem 
of decreasing faculty occurred in Walker v. School District of 
City of Scranton, 12 A.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. 1940). The plaintiffs
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not only included Gertrude Walker but other faculty members. 
Plaintiffs were appointed as professional employees of the 
School District under what may be referred to as the "Scranton 
plan of appointment." This plan was devised by the Board of 
Directors in an effort to select those best qualified to teach. 
After the applicants for appointment presented their certificates 
from the Department of Public Instruction licensing them to 
teach, they were examined by the School Board to determine their 
qualifications to teach those courses. They were rated on this 
examination and their names placed on a list as eligible for 
appointment to that teaching assignment for which they were 
examined. All plaintiffs qualified under the "Scranton plan of 
appointment" to teach in the intermediate grades of the School 
District and taught in that teaching assignment. None of them 
qualified under the plan to teach in any other assignment, 
either in the elementary schools or in the high schools of the 
District. School directors suspended the necessary number of 
professional employees where a decrease in pupil population 
occurred. Suspensions occurred in the inverse order of their 
appointment, without regard to the suspended employees' senior­
ity to employees in other assignments, even though the suspended 
senior employees were licensed to teach in other subjects.
Plaintiffs were working under their original appointments 
when suspended. If any one of them had been transferred to 
another teaching assignment subsequent to her appointment a 
further problem would have been created. The court ruled that 
each plaintiff's case be disposed of on its own particular
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facts. The court favored the school district and stated:
"each School Board is empowered to administer the public school 
system within its school district. To enable it to do so 
efficiently and in the best interest of the children, it may 
adopt and enforce reasonable rules and regulation" (Walker v. 
School District).
Another case with a decrease in student population was 
Wall V. Stanly County Board of Education, No. 11019, 378 F.2d 
275 (4th Cir. 1967). This case was an action by a Negro school 
teacher seeking reemployment by the County Board of Education. 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of 
North Carolina denied relief, and an appeal was taken.
Audrey Gillis Wall, who had 13 years of experience, was 
recommended for reemployment in county school system, but, 
after shift in pupil enrollment resulting from freedom of 
choice desegregation plan, was not reemployed due to decrease 
in allocation of teacher spaces to Negro schools. Therefore, 
she was not allowed by the School Board to compete for another 
teaching position. On the basis of merit and qualifications,
Ms. Wall felt that she was entitled to damages for such dis­
crimination, including salary difference between former position 
and new position subsequently obtained by the teacher, as well 
as moving expenses to her new residence. The School Board was 
charged with violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Previous court cases had established:
(1) that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the selection,
retention, and assignment of public school teachers on 
the basis of race;
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(2) that reduction in the number of students and faculty 
in a previously’ all-Negro school will not alone 
justify the discharge or failure to reemploy Negro 
teachers in a school system;
(3) that teachers displaced from formerly homogeneous 
schools must be judged by definite objective standards 
with all other teachers in the system for continued 
employment.
With these principles, the district court denied relief to the 
Negro school teacher, Ms. Audrey Wall. Since Ms. Wall was 
recommended for reemployment by her principal and his recommenda­
tion approved by the School Board, the Court of Appeals said that 
the unfair rejection of her application for reemployment entitles 
her to recover damages.
M s . Wall managed to secure employment elsewhere for the 
school year 1965-1966. Proper damage elements included salary 
differences, if any, and moving expenses to her new residence.
A case cited many times regarding dismissals was Morey 
V .  Independent School District, No. 1-69 Civ. 74, 312 F . Supp. 
1257 (D.Minn. 1969). In February of 1962, the defendant school 
district, acting through the School Board, attempted to termi­
nate Edith Morey's teaching contract. A hearing was held before 
the school board which resulted in her discharge. Thereafter,
Ms. Morey brought an action for back pay in the Mower County 
District Court for the State of Minnesota. The case was tried 
before a state district court judge, without a jury. Ms. Morey 
was awarded damages of $26,888.19 for back salary, interest, and
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various medical and hospital insurance benefits. In March of 
1967, Morey resumed her teaching job for defendant school dis­
trict. Earlier the state district court judge determined that 
plaintiff was not entitled to be reimbursed for any increments 
in her salary during the period.
Later the plaintiff made a complaint that the School Board 
had failed to reimburse her for usual and customary scheduled 
salary increases afforded other teachers of like education and 
experience within the School District for the period 1962 to the 
present date. That such failure to reimburse her said increases 
were in violation of her due process and equal protection right 
secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States. The complaint demanded judgment for $14,301 
for lost earnings, $50,000 for damages to her reputation, and 
$50,000 for damages.
The action was under the Civil Rights Act against the 
School Board and individual members by school teacher for lost 
earnings, for damages to her reputation and for injunctive re­
lief. On motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for 
failure to state a claim, the District Court, Miles W. Lord, J., 
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and stated that the 
school district was not subject to suit under the Civil Rights 
Act and that failure of individual members to grant periodic 
salary increases during the period from improper discharge to 
reinstatement did not constitute deprivation of any right, 
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws.
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Many educators were dismissed for other reasons than a 
•decrease in pupil population. Gouge and Klein v. Joint School 
District No. 1 , Nos. 69-C-166, 165, 310 F. Supp. 984 (D.Wis.
1970) , was an action by teachers whose contracts were not re­
newed against the school district and the Board of Education 
for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and an order com­
pelling reinstatement. The defendants moved for summary judg­
ment dismissing the actions. Gouge v. Joint School District 
involved two plaintiffs who were Ms. Saxon Gouge and Ms. Viola G. 
Klein. These were civil actions to challenge the defendants' 
decisions not to retain plaintiffs as teachers in Joint School 
District No. 1. Each plaintiff sought compensatory damages, and 
c in  order compelling reinstatement in her teaching position.
Mrs. Gouge was retained as a teacher by the Board of Edu­
cation for the school years 1963-1964 through 1968-1969 on a 
series of one-year contracts. At a meeting of the Board held 
on February 25, 1969, Johnson, Administrator of Joint School 
District, recommended nonrenewal of Gouge's contract for the 
1969-1970 school year. Johnson informed the Board that Gouge 
was and had been for some time in a relatively poor state of 
physical health. In his opinion, she had shown an inability to 
plan and conduct the elementary school vocal music program, and, 
repeatedly left the class for short periods without explanation. 
By unanimous vote, the Board decided to consider the nonrenewal 
of Gouge's contract. On February 26, 1969, Johnson gave such 
written notice to Gouge. She requested a private conference 
with the Board and a written letter of reasons for her dismissal.
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The meeting was held and the Board voted unanimously, again 
not to renew Gouge's contract.
The other defendant Klein had been employed as teacher 
by the school district for 18 years, on a series of one-year 
contracts. At the February 25, 1969, meeting of the School 
Board defendant Johnson recommended the nonrenewal of Klein's 
teaching contract for the 1969-197-0 school year be considered 
for the following reasons:
Klein had been "unable to adapt to departmentalized 
team teaching"; Klein did not have the knowledge or 
training to efficiently or effectively teach as a mem­
ber of the teaching team handling the program; Klein 
had persisted in a self-contained program; and Klein 
had caused disharmony among the middle school staff.
After presentation and discussion of these reasons the Board 
voted unanimously to consider nonrenewal of Klein's contract. 
The Board directed Johnson to advise Klein of their decision. 
Klein received the letter and requested a private conference 
with the Board.
Defendants contended that plaintiffs had no right to re­
newal of their teaching contracts under the substantive law of 
Wisconsin. Wisconsin case law permitted the defendants to 
refuse to renew a teacher's contract for any cause or no cause 
at all except that the decision of nonrenewal cannot be based 
upon constitutionally impermissible grounds. The courts ex­
pressed no opinion as to what the requirements of Wisconsin 
were, but the issue presented was whether the defendants met
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the minimal requirements of substantive and procedural due 
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution in coming to the decision not to renew the 
plaintiffs' contracts.
The Court ruled that summary judgment of dismissal was 
inappropriate because there was a genuine issue of material.
The Courts concluded that in the Gouge and Klein case, both 
letters frcm Johnson had reasons stated that were limited and 
softly expressed. Also, the Board gave each plaintiff cause to 
believe that only a single reason was actually under consider­
ation.
The District Court, James E. Doyle, J., held that a teach­
er in a public elementary or secondary school is entitled to a 
statement of reasons for considering nonrenewal and a notice of 
a hearing at which the teacher can respond to the stated reasons. 
The Court order was that the school district's motions in both 
of the above actions for summary judgments of dismissal are 
granted with respect to the claims for damages against them.
But in all other respects, the school district's motions in both 
of the above entitled actions for summary judgment of dismissal 
were denied.
In Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, No. 
28188, 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), another dismissal case 
appeared by Ms. Harkless and other Negro school teachers against 
school district and against trustees and superintendent of the 
district in their official capacities for violation of teacher's 
civil rights in failure of school to renew teaching contracts
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when school system was desegregated. This appeal involved an 
action brought by ten Negro teachers who alleged that the 
failure of the school district to renew their teaching contracts 
denied them rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. They 
were seeking reinstatement and back pay.
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Texas, James L. Noel, J., ordered back pay and all other 
factual issues and dismissed the claims. An appeal was taken.
The Court of Appeals held that the school district, as well as 
trustees and superintendent in their official capacities, was 
within meaning of person as used in Civil Rights Act, for pur­
poses of being subject to suit, but the seeking of equitable 
relief, reinstatement, and back pay was subject to jury trial.
Women are dismissed for a variety of reasons. Elizabeth 
Anna Duke was dismissed in 1972 for making speeches using pro­
fane language and criticizing the university administration 
and policies. In Duke v. North Texas State University, No. 
71-3198, 469 F2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), she was seeking an in­
junction reinstating her. The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Texas, William Wayne Justice, J., 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, and an appeal was taken.
Ms. Elizabeth Anna Duke filed a complaint on May 13, 1971 
against North Texas State University alleging that the University 
violated her First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights per­
taining to freedom of speech and due process of law when it 
withdrew an offer to employ her as a teaching assistant. On 
two evenings, Ms. Duke appeared before and made an address to
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an unauthorized and unsponsored group. During the course of 
her address she was accused of using profane and obscene lan­
guage and discredited the University administration and the 
governing board of the University. In early August, 1970, Mr. 
John Carter, Acting President of North Texas State University 
learned of Ms. Duke's actions and directed an investigation.
He reported the results of the investigation to a meeting of the 
Board of Regents on August 19, and the Regents instructed him to 
conduct an additional investigation and if the charges were true 
to dismiss her. President Carter investigated and wrote Ms.
Duke of her dismissal and optional hearing.
Since Ms. Duke was without tenure, and her appointment for 
the preceding term had expired, the University proceeded on the 
basis that the procedure prescribed by the "Statement on Aca­
demic Freedom" did not govern her case. One of the most dis­
turbing aspects of this case is that Ms. Duke was notified that 
the appeal before the Regents would consist of a review of the 
transcript and that there would be no witnesses.
The Court of Appeals held that the University did not pro­
duce any persuasive evidence concerning the scope of interests 
in which they had been infringed. Since the University was 
trying to maintain a competent faculty and a public confidence 
in the university the case was reversed in favor of the Uni­
versity.
Another case involving dismissal was Schreiber v. Joint 
School District No.1, Gibraltar, Wisconsin, No. 70-C-270, 335 
F. Supp. 745 (D.Wis. 1972). This was a case in which a teacher
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brought civil rights action challenging her dismissal. The 
civil action was in request of a summary judgment requesting 
$100,000 damages and reinstatement. Ms. Schreiber had become 
engaged to Robert Schreiber but the wedding was postponed be­
cause Mr. Schreiber had to obtain permission of the court to 
remarry. Ms. Schreiber had been living with a family during 
the summer of 1969 which was to terminate September 1. She 
had difficulty in finding a room and moved into Mr. Schreiber's 
home. A rumor suggested that a petition was being circulated 
in an attempt to have her fired because of this act. But by 
the end of the month she had found an apartment in which to 
live until the wedding.
On October 24, 1969, plaintiff received a letter dated 
October 22, 1969. The Board of Education accused her of "un­
professional conduct." Finally, the Board of Education, in 
executive session, voted to request Ms. Schreiber to tender 
her.resignation effective December 1, 1969. She refused to 
resign, and on November 11, 1969, again in executive session, 
the Board of Education decided to terminate her employment.
The District Court held that where teacher under one-year 
contract was dismissed during the course of the year, due pro­
cess entitled her to a statement of the reasons for dismissal 
and notice of hearing at which to respond to such reasons; and 
that money judgment for back pay would be equitable rather than 
legel in nature. The defendant's motion was denied and the 
plaintiff's motion was granted.
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A state Federal Employment Practice agency had jurisdiction 
to decide whether an employee of the state University had been 
discharged due to sex bias in Regents of University of Colorado 
V .  Colorado Civil Rights Commission, No. 72-1810-1, 7 EPD 6445 
(D.Colo. 1973). Betty Nesheim was employed by the University 
of Colorado Medical Center from 1962 until 1970, when she was 
terminated from her position. After termination Nesheim filed 
a grievance with the University of Colorado Medical Center 
alleging that her discharge was based upon sex discrimination.
The Commission ordered that Nesheim be offered reinstate­
ment in a similar job from which she was discharged. The Com­
mission further ordered that the University pay Ms. Nesheim 
back pay from the date of her discharge to the day she was 
offered re-employment, provided, however, that the respondents 
may withhold federal and state income tax. The order of the 
Commission further provided that in the event of a dispute as 
to the offer of reinstatement or the amount of back pay due, 
the Commission would hold further hearings to determine it.
O'Dessa J. Shipley was employed by Fisk University as Dean 
of Women from September 5, 1969 to June 9, 1971. Her employ­
ment was on a one-year basis. By letter defendants advised 
Ms. Shipley that her contract of employment would not be renewed 
due to reorganization of the Office of Student Personnel at the 
University. Her contract of employment was for the job of Dean 
of Women. She was moved to the faculty housing complex and 
failed to pay the $130 monthly rental to the defendant. The
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University began to withhold from her monthly paychecks the 
unpaid rent.
On May 19, 1971, plaintiff filed a complaint against de­
fendants with the Office of Civil Rights, United States Depart­
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, alleging sex and race 
discrimination. The complaint was that the Dean of Men received 
free rent while plaintiff did not. Furthermore, she was not re­
hired .
The court found that the University did not discriminate 
against O'Dessa J. Shipley on the basis of sex with regard to 
compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of her employ­
ment. Therefore, it was the opinion of the court that judgment 
be entered against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendants, 
with costs to be assessed to Ms. Shipley (Shipley v. Fisk 
University, No. 6975, 7 FEP 244 (M.D.Tenn. 1973).
In Soucy V .  Board of Education of North Colonie Central 
School District No. 5 , 41 A.D.2d 984 (U.S. 1973), the petitioner 
was a teacher with 23 years of experience and for the last 21 
years has been employed by the district as an elementary teach­
er. She had been tenured on three occasions by the board.
After a new principal was hired, Alton Downer, Ms. Soucy was 
dismissed.
The charges were incompetency as evidenced by:
1. time wasted on class plans
2. lack of planning for definite readiness sequence
3. lack of units in art, music and science.
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Also charged was conduct unbecoming a teacher, as evidenced
by:
1. alleged falsification of the Metropolitan reading test
2. missing library materials found in petitioner's 
locker
3. certain list belonging to another teacher which peti­
tioner returned to the library as her own.
Ms. Soucy was served with charges and demanded a hearing.
A panel recommended that she be dismissed and the Board of 
Education on August 16, 1971 followed the recommendation and 
voted to dismiss her. In summary, the petitioner was dismissed 
for acts of incompetence; she was denied notice with appropriate 
detail of the charges, and prejudicial and irrelevant testimony 
was admitted at the hearing. The case went through several 
courts of appeals in New York. Finally, the Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division held that the petitioner be reinstated to­
gether with appropriate back salary.
Women have and are asking for equal rights for themselves 
and others in employment. With such unsatisfactory laws pos­
sibly new ones need to be enacted or the older ones need to be 
revised. Judge Jackson stated, "But I know of no way that we 
can have equal justice under the law except we have some law" 
(Brown V .  Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 546, 97 Led 469, 73 S.Ct. 397).
An example of a case requesting civil or equal rights was 
Andrews and Rogers v. Drew Municipal Separate School District,
No. GC 73-20-K, 371 F. Supp 27 (D.Miss. 1973). This civil 
rights action was brought against a school district, its trustees
73
and superintendent. The case sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief to redress alleged deprivation of rights and privileges 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The complaint alleged that plaintiffs, Katie Mae Andrews 
and Destine Rogers, both of whom were black females, qualified 
to be employed as teachers' aides in the Drew Public Schools. 
They were wrongfully denied employment because of a local policy 
which forbade employment of school personnel who are unwed 
parents. Plaintiffs contended that this policy was violative 
of equal protection because it created an unconstitutional class­
ification to both race and sex.
The District Court held that the policy of barring an 
otherwise qualified person from being employed in public schools 
merely because of the person's previously having had an ille­
gitimate child had no rational relation to objectives by school 
officials. The case was dismissed.
Action for monetary damages as well as injuncitve relief 
was brought against a state University and one of its employ­
ees for alleged violation of a teacher's civil rights on the 
grounds that she was not retained for employment because of 
her sex in Van De Vate v. Boling, No. 8463, 379 F. Supp. 925 
(D.Tenn. 1974) . Defendants denied that they discriminated 
against the plaintiff on account of her sex or on any other un­
lawful basis in her efforts to gain employment in the Department 
of Music.
In the light of the testimony, the Court concluded that 
the action taken by the individual defendant and the University
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of Tennessee was a result of a personality clash between the 
individuals involved, and nothing more. There was no evidence 
in this record to indicate that Nancy H. Van De Vate had any­
thing to do with the decision not to employ her. The Court's 
prerogative was not to interject itself into the educational 
institution and to not require an institution to either hire 
or not hire a professor.
Van De Vate argued, however, that a careful reading of 
Executive Order 11,246, as amended by Executive Orders 11,375 
and 11,478 compelled a different conclusion. Since she had 
not established a prima facie case of discrimination on the 
basis of sex, she cannot rely upon the Executive Orders and 
the regulations cited to establish her case. The action was 
dismissed.
After her prior action involving the same factual situa­
tion had been dismissed, a former associate professor of anthro­
pology at a private college filed a so-called "amended complaint" 
alleging that her constitutional rights had been violated when 
her contract of employment with the College was not renewed in 
Pendrell v. Chatham College, No. 74-621, 386 F.Supp. 341 (D Pa.
1974). On December 10, 1971, the plaintiff in these actions 
alleged that her Constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated when her contract 
of employment was not renewed. On January 23, 197 4, the Court 
entered an opinion on the College's motion to dismiss because 
Chatham College was a private institution, and Nan Pendrell was 
unable to state a claim for relief under a certain section.
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June 24, 1974, Nan Pendrell filed, under a new civil 
action number, what is called an "Amended Complaint." An im­
portant note is that the plaintiff had moved to another state, 
Pennsylvania.
The Court found that the defendant's motion to dismiss 
was granted as to those portions of plaintiff's amended com­
plaint which attempted to state a claim under Pennsylvania 
State Law. Ms. Pendrell was ordered to amend her pleadings so 
as to conform with the order of the Court. Motion was granted 
in part and denied in part regarding dismissal of case.
Another case brought under the Civil Rights Act was 
Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, No. 74-1313, 386 F. Supp.
1337 (D.Pa. 1974). A former assistant professor brought action 
against college and College officials charging that nonrenewal 
of her employment was based on sex discrimination. On Febru­
ary 29, 1972, the plaintiff received notification from the 
college that she would not be reappointed as an assistant pro­
fessor for the 1972-197 3 academic year because they were going 
to absorb her position into a new post in which she did not 
quality. Barbara Z. Presseisen filed a charge of sex discrim­
ination with the EEOC. Her complaint against the College was 
dismissed by the EEOC on the grounds that Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act did not apply to educational institutions with 
respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connect­
ed with the educational activities. The Civil Rights Act does 
not apply to the claim filed prior to effective date of amend­
ment striking exemption for educational institution. Although,
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with the help of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 
a sex discrimination charge was filed against Swarthmore 
College.
On Swarthmore College's motion to dismiss, the District 
Court held that the College enjoyed national reputation and 
attracted students and faculty from all over the country. Motion 
was denied.
Former teachers at Virginia institutions of higher educa­
tion brought sex discrimination action against state council of 
higher education and certain named defendants. The defendants 
moved for dismissal. The case was Taliaferro v. State Council 
of Higher Education, No. 73-584-R, 372 F.Supp. (E.D.Va.1974).
Ruth Taliaferro and other female teachers at Virginia 
institutions of higher education were seeking monetary and 
injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and others similarly 
situated from alleged deprivations of constitutional rights 
arising during the course of their employment, including their 
dismissal. Taliaferro was allegedly forced into retirement by 
the discriminatory action of the defendants, effective Septem­
ber 1973. Plaintiff Dyson was allegedly dismissed by the actions 
of the defendants, effective at the end of the 1972-1973 year 
and denied reinstatement at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute 
and State University.
The District Court held that state council of higher edu­
cation and named defendants, in their official capacities, were 
not "persons" for purposes of either monetary or injunctive re­
lief under the Civil Rights Act. The case was dismissed.
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The State Human Rights Appeal Board vacated an order of 
the State Division of Human Rights dismissing a discrimination 
complaint in Queensborough Community College of the City 
University of New York v. State Human Rights Appeal Board,
State Division of Human Rights, 49 A.D.2d 765 (Sup.N.Y. 1975). 
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that Ethne Elsie K. 
Marenco's cause of action for discriminatory notice of nonre- 
appointment occurred when Marenco received notice of nonre­
appointment, and the limitation period that began to run. The 
action was barred. Ms. Marenco's discrimination complaint, 
filed with the State Division of Human Rights some 20 months 
after she was given notice that she would not be reappointed 
as an assistant professor at Queensborough Community College 
was time-barred. The case was dismissed because the complaint 
of Ethne Elsie K. Marenco was not filed within the prescribed 
period. The case was remanded to the Divison of Human Rights 
for further proceedings.
In a Statute of Westminster it was stated, "That no man 
of what estate or condition, shall be put out of land of tene­
ment, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to 
death, with being brought in answer by due process of law"
(28 Edw. Ill (1354). Due process was a popular issue in regards 
to teacher rights. A discharged black teacher brought civil 
rights action and alleged that discharge was a result of de­
segregation and that she was denied procedural due process.
The case was Blunt v. Marion County School Board, No. 74-1279, 
515 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1975).
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In May, 1969, on grounds of incompetency the School Board 
of Marion County, Florida, terminated the employment contract 
of Ms. Hattie M. Blunt, a black school teacher of some 25 years 
experience. Unsuccessful in the administrative appeal from the 
School Board decision, Ms. Blunt initiated this civil rights 
suit which challenged the constitutionality of her dismissal.
She alleged that in the course of proceedings before the Marion 
County School Board and the Florida State Board of Education 
certain of her constitutional rights had been violated. The 
relief sought was reinstatement of Ms. Blunt's teaching con­
tract, along with back pay and retirement benefits.
The Court stated that M s . Blunt was denied substantive 
due process. For sound policy reasons, courts are reluctant 
to intrude upon the internal affairs of local school author­
ities in such matters as a teacher's competency (Ferguson v. 
Thomas, 5 Cir. 1970, 430 F.2d 852, 858).
The United States District Court entered judgment in favor 
of defendants, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals 
held that School Board's finding of incompetency was supported 
by substantial evidence so that teacher was not denied sub­
stantive due process and that there were no terminations made 
in the total professional staff of the school system in order 
to accommodate desegregation effort so it was not necessary 
to compare plaintiff's qualifications with those of all other 
teachers. Ms. Blunt was not dismissed on account of race and 
that she was not denied procedural due process. The Appeals 
Court affirmed.
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As stated by Flygare, "The Supreme Court has noted on 
numerous occasions that due process is a flexible concept. It 
must be tailored to balance the interests of the government 
with the rights of the individuals involved in the dispute" 
(1976, p. 206) .
Another case involving due process was Gray v. Union 
County Intermediate Education District, No. 73-3072, 520 F.2d 
803 (9th Cir. 1975). A special education teacher brought a 
suit against the county intermediate education district, its 
acting superintendent and members of its board of directors.
Ms. Gray alleged that the district violated her due process 
and First Amendment rights in connection with nonrenewal of her 
teaching contract. Ms. Gray was employed on a year-to-year 
contract basis.
During the spring of 19 70, Mary C. Gray became involved 
in an effort to assist a student who had become pregnant.
Ms. Gray advised the girl that she had a right to a therapeutic 
abortion. The girl was made a ward of the State Welfare De­
partment and the Department decided an abortion was not advis­
able . Ms. Gray insisted that the girl be dealt with in a 
manner other than as the Welfare Department had determined was 
best, thereby creating a problem in the relationship of Union 
County Intermediate Education District (I.E.D.) and the Welfare 
Department. I.E.D. is a separate entity with its own budget, 
staff and Board of Directors, but it does not operate any 
school. In March of 1971, the I.E.D. Board voted not to renew 
the appellant's contract for 1971-1972 and a hearing on the
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matter was held at Ms. Gray's request on April 14,
1971.
The Board voted to sustain their original decision not to 
hire Ms. Gray for the upcoming year, and this suit followed. 
Although the District Court found that the incident involving 
the pregnant student formed part of the basis for the Board's 
decision, the Court also found that Ms. Gray's activities with 
regard to this matter exceeded the scope of free speech, and, 
thus, the appellant's first amendment rights were not violated. 
In addition, the District Court held that the nonrenewal of 
Ms. Gray's contract did not result in either a loss of liberty 
or property to her, and, therefore, she was not denied due pro­
cess.
The Court of Appeals, William D. Murray, District Judge, 
held that nonrenewal of teacher's contract did not constitute 
a denial of her First Amendment or due process rights. The 
decision was affirmed.
An action under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 was 
brought by Dr. Peters against Middlebury College, Peters v. 
Middlebury College, No. 73-153, 12 FEP 296 (D.Vt. 1976). The 
suit was in reference to the dismissal of Peters after a two 
year teaching position.
The Court decided that the college did not violate Title 
VII when it did not grant a third-year teaching contract to 
Dr. Peters who taught Reniassance literature. The decision 
was based upon professional judgment that the instructor’s 
qualifications to teach advanced courses in English department
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were in substantial accord that the weakest point in the 
department was Renaissance literature, and the instructor was 
unable to lecture adequately on John Donne and Ben Johnson. 
Therefore, the decision not to reappoint her was made accord­
ing to prescribed procedures, and at each step she was given 
the same consideration as any instructor under consideration 
for reappointment and review. The case was dismissed.
The majority of the litigation occurred in the area of 
dismissal, the third category. Doris Sassower explained,
"Legal action by women is a powerful wedge in opening doors 
long closed and that they must be unhesitating in asserting 
their rights and demanding remedies to secure relief against 
deeply-felt complaints" (1972, p. 29).
Within this section, female teachers were dismissed for 
reasons of incompetency. This term has many connotations and 
becomes difficult for the courts to rule upon. Therefore, 
educational institutions found that dismissing women on the 
grounds of incompetency was easier than using other rationale 
(Horosko V .  School District of Mount Pleasant Township, Soucy 
V .  Board of Education, and Blunt v. Marion County School 
Board).
Women were discriminated against in regard to appointments 
due to the decrease of student population (Walker v. School 
District of City of Scranton, Wall v. Stanly County Board of 
Education, Gouge S Klein v. Joint School District). Women were 
dismissed when the student population declined in compliance 
with desegregation.
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Many reasons for dismissal were justifiable, but others 
were inadequate. Discrimination charges were filed when women 
were dismissed because positions were to be absorbed into new 
posts (Presseisen v. Swarthmore College and Shipley v. Fisk 
University). Discrimination charges also occurred when a 
woman was forced into early retirement (Taliaferro v. State 
Council of Higher Education). Yet these forms of discrimina­
tion were hard to prove in the courts.
Value judgments sometimes entered into the dismissal 
charge (Jones and Schreiber v. Joint School District No. 1).
Women in comparison to their fellow male workers were judged 
on a double standard. Andrews and Rogers v. Drew Municipal 
Separate School District illustrated an example of this point. 
This double standard constitutes unneeded discrimination to­
ward women.
Many times women were dismissed without being given a 
justification which constitutes, in many cases, lack of due 
process. At times administrators took grievances to the 
school board without the employee's knowledge (Gouge and Klein 
V. Joint School District No. 1). This act of neglecting proper 
due process also entered into job discrimination relating to 
dismissals (Duke v. North Texas State University and Gray v.
Union County Intermediate Education District.)
Pregnancy
As discussed Katherine T. Barlett in the California Law 
Review, "Pregnancy is unique. Only women may experience 
pregnancy; most women can, and in the United States approximately
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84% of the married women do at least once"(1974, p. 1532).
That women may and do become pregnant was the most significant 
single factor used to justify the countless laws and practices 
that have dis advantaged women for centuries. Woman's role as 
childbearer has given rise to many of the most common Western 
sterotypes about women. These sterotypes have often been 
characterized as part of the divine order:
The constitution of the family organization, which is 
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature 
of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which 
properly belongs to the domain and functions of woman­
hood. ..The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to 
fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. 
This is the law of the Creator (Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873).
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court renewed legal support 
of these sterotypes. In upholding a statute which permitted 
females in effect to exempt themselves from jury duty, it 
wrote :
Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the 
restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their 
entry into many parts of community life formerly con­
sidered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as 
the center of home and family life (Hoyt v. Florida, 368 
U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961).
Laws and practices that single out pregnancy for special 
treatment are not limited in their effect to pregnant women.
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A woman who might become pregnant is also affected 
(Bartlett, 1974).
The primary thrust of EEOC's policies relative to materni­
ty and childbirth is that the employer should treat these 
conditions, for the purposes of applying personnel practices 
and policies, just as he would treat all other temporary dis­
abilities (Oehmke, 1974).
Under guidelines issued by EEOC, an applicant or employee 
may not be discriminated against because of pregnancy. 
Disabilities caused orggamigâb^ed to by pregnancy, mis­
carriage, abortiag^j^^Nj^^N^^^l^^d recover should be 
considered should be treated
as such unde.''^|H|H|mHHH|y|||jH|H^Wisability insur­
ance or (Terlin, 1975,
p. 15) .
One of the ear^^B||BBBB^HBM|||||Bfegnancy was Appeal 
of School District of 32 A.2d 565 (Pa. Sup.
Ct. 1943), which occurred in 1942. Incompetency was the just­
ification of the school district for the pregnant teacher to 
leave. "Incompetency" as used in the Teachers' Tenure Act, 
was a valid cause for termination of contract with profession­
al employees of school district and embraced lack of physical 
ability to perform duties incident to the employment.
As was stated, "incompetency" was a relative term which 
may be employed as meaning disqualification, inability, in­
capability, lack of ability, legal qualification, or fitness 
to discharge the required duty. Furthermore, it means general
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(Bartlett, 1974).
The primary thrust of EEOC's policies relative to materni­
ty and childbirth is that the employer should treat these 
conditions, for the purposes of applying personnel practices 
and policies, just as he would treat all other temporary dis­
abilities (Oehmke, 1974).
Under guidelines issued by EEOC, an applicant or employee 
may not be discriminated against because of pregnancy. 
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, mis­
carriage, abortion, or childbirth and recover should be 
considered temporary disabilities and should be treated 
as such under any health or temporary disability insur­
ance or sick leave plan of the employer (Terlin, 1975, 
p. 15) .
One of the earlier cases involving pregnancy was Appeal 
of School District of City of Bethlehem, 32 A.2d 565 (Pa. Sup. 
Ct. 1943), which occurred in 1942. Incompetency was the just­
ification of the school district for the pregnant teacher to 
leave. "Incompetency" as used in the Teachers' Tenure Act, 
was a valid cause for termination of contract with profession­
al employees of school district and embraced lack of physical 
ability to perform duties incident to the employment.
As was stated, "incompetency" was a relative term which 
may be employed as meaning disqualification, inability, in­
capability, lack of ability, legal qualification, or fitness 
to discharge the required duty. Furtheirmore, it means general
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lack of capacity or fitness, or lack of the special qualities 
required for a particular purpose.
Mrs. Brown in Appeal of School District of City of 
Bethlehem was employed originally by the appellant as a dental 
hygienist in 1932 and continued to perform her duties in that 
capacity until September 3, 1941. She was married during the 
school year of 1937-1938 and executed a contract in a statutory 
form prescribed by Section 2 of the Teachers' Tenure Act. The 
Tenure Act permitted certain restrictions for termination which 
were immorality, incompetency, intemperance, cruelty, persistent 
negligence, mental derangement, persistent and willful violation 
of the school laws.
On July 13, 1941, Mrs. Brown advised the Board by letter 
that because of her physical condition a leave was necessary.
Her physician enclosed one also. Not until August 12 did she 
forward a letter of her condition, which was pregnancy.
Mrs. Brown was informed that sick leave was denied. The Board, 
after giving her an opportunity to resign, which she refused 
to do, passed a resolution with formal charges for her dismissal. 
Within this resolution, incompetency was mentioned.
The Court stated that Mrs. Brown was not being discrimi­
nated against because of her marriage, which occurred prior to 
the events which have recited. Her dismissal was due neither 
to that fact nor to her legitimate pregnancy, but because she 
became incompetent due to her physical incapacity to discharge 
her duties. The Court favored the School Board because they 
were unable to discover any indication of an abuse.
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In La Fleur v. Cleveland Board of Education, Nos. C 
71-292, C 71-333 326 F.Supp. 1208 (D.Ohio 1971), the employ­
ment contract of the Virginia School Board provided that all 
pregnant teachers would be "terminated" at least four months 
prior to the expected birth of the child; they could be el­
igible for reemployment only after a physician certified their 
physical firmness and the School Board found an opening. The 
Cleveland, Ohio regulations provided for a mandatory leave of 
absence without pay, beginning not less than five months be­
fore the expected birth of the child and extending for a 
maximum of two years. After the child reached three months of 
age, the teacher would be eligible to return to work, provided 
application accompanied by a physician's certificate of fitness 
was made six weeks before the beginning of the semester and 
there existed a vacancy for which she was qualified.
At first, the purpose the effect of these regulations 
seemed obvious in order to protect the teacher's health and to 
assure the continuity of the instructional program in the class­
room. A mandatory suspension of duties was justified only to 
the extent that pregnancy and the after effects of childbirth 
actually impaired a teacher's ability to function. The degree 
to which pregnancy affects women's health and vitality varies 
enormously with widely differing effects on their ability to 
work. Thus, some women might be so seriously impaired from the 
time of conception that they could no longer perform their 
normal employment functions; others might be quite capable of 
working until the onset of labor. The majority would be found
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somewhere between these extremes. The point at which the 
performance of normal employment functions will actually be 
impaired was a highly variable matter; it depends upon a 
medical evaluation of each woman's health in relation to the 
stresses imposed upon her by her employment (Johnston, 19 74).
In LaFleur v. Cleveland, the school Board presented ex­
tensive evidence concerning the medical problems and educa­
tional complications associated with teaching problems and 
educational complications associated with teaching during the 
latter months of pregnancy, and the Court concluded that the 
Board's leave policy was, therefore, reasonable. In 19 72, 
this decision was reversed by an appellate Court.
In Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School District, No.
445, 4 EPD 5587 (App. Pa. 1971), the Court upheld the discharge 
of a teacher who had failed to resign at the end of her fifth 
month of pregnancy as required by a regulation of the Board of 
Education which employed her. Cheryl Cerra argued that preg­
nancy was an illness like any other illness and therefore it 
would be unlawfully discriminatory to classify it otherwise.
As the Court pointed out, the plaintiff's own medical expert 
testified that current thinking regarded pregnancy as a phy­
siological condition, not an illness. The Board of Education 
based its termination policy on its previous unsuccessful ex­
perience with maternity leaves because several teachers had 
opted not to return to work following such leaves. The Court 
found the regulation of the school district as invalid and un­
constitutional .
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In Cohn V .  Chesterfield, No. 678-70-R, 326 F.Supp. 1159 
(D.Va. 1972), Susan Cohen, a Virginia high school teacher, 
knew that her School Board required that she take a leave at 
the end of her fifth month of pregnancy. But she felt that the 
rule was unreasonable, unfair, and unnecessary, and soon after 
becoming pregnant she requested maternity leave which would 
begin at the end of her eighth month. Pursuant to established 
policy, the Board denied her request and granted her leave be­
ginning four months before she expected her child. Cohen 
believed that the Board's decision violated her constitutional 
rights, and she appealed the decision to the local federal 
court.
The Court found neither medical nor psychological reasons 
for a pregnant teacher to be required to take a leave of 
absence at the end of the fifth month of pregnancy. The Court 
also found that constitutional protection extends to all teach­
ers "whose exclusion pursuant to a regulation is arbitrary of 
discriminatory". In the words of the Court:
The maternity policy of the School Board denies pregnant 
women such as Mrs. Cohen equal protection of the laws 
because it treats pregnancy differently than other medical 
disabilities. Because pregnancy, though unique to women, 
is like other medical conditions, failure to treat it as 
such amounts to discrimination which is without rational 
basis, and therefore is violative of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (Cohen v. Chesterfield).
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William A. Carey who at one time was General Counsel of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission remarked that the 
hottest issue in sex discrimination was that of pregnancy, 
which brings to the courts questions of maternity leave and 
medical benefits. Two cases, LaFleur v. Board of Education 
and Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, brought pur­
suance to Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
(Title VII coverage did not extend at this time to state and 
local units of government). The plaintiffs claimed in each 
case that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment had been violated as to them by the enforcement of the 
maternity leave policies, which they claimed were an uncon­
stitutional discrimination on grounds of sex (Carey, 1974).
The facts in the Cohen case were virtually identical to 
those before the case of Williams v. San Francisco Unified 
School District, No. 72-2092, 522 F. 2d (D.1972). This case 
was an action attacking school district's mandatory maternity 
leave policy. Plaintiff moved for preliminary injunction. The 
District Court held that the policy violated the equal protec­
tion clause by singling out pregnant certificated employees 
for classification without any relation to any legitimate 
objective of district. The motion was granted.
Amelia Williams was employed by San Francisco Unified 
School District as a social worker in its special program for 
pregnant students at the San Francisco General Hospital. Her 
work consisted of advising students in various aspects of
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their pregnancies, helping them find alternatives available 
upon the birth of their children.
Mrs. Williams had been advised by her doctor that delivery 
was in late April 1972. The District's maternity leave stated 
that the employee should be absent from duty for a period of 
at least two months before the anticipated birth of her child 
and have the option to return after one month. The District 
Court decided in Amelia Williams' favor.
Pregnancy is a unique condition, but it is one which de­
fines the female sex. Its uniqueness explains why sex dis­
crimination is in many respects different from other forms of 
discrimination, but it does settle the question of whether 
pregnancy classifications discriminate on the basis of sex 
(Bartlett, 1974).
Susan A. Bravo sued on behalf of herself individually and 
all others similarly situated. The case was Bravo v. Board of 
Education of City of Chicago, No. 72 C 970, 345 F. Supp. 155 
(N.D.Ill. 1972). Civil rights action by pregnant teacher was 
brought against School Board.
The complaint charged the Board of Education of the City of 
Chicago and other named defendants with discrimination against 
pregnant school teachers in violation of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871, 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the Equal Protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and various Illinois statutes.
Mrs. Bravo had been a certified teacher for the Board 
since 1964. She was expected to deliver on or about June 22,
91
1972. She decided to apply for maternity leave from her 
position beginning April 12. The Board stated that her last 
working day would be March 30, and she could not return to 
teaching until September 20, 1972. The Board also asserted 
that the leave period was reasonably related to its objective 
of protecting pregnant teachers and their unborn babies against 
the assaults, accidents, diseases, and physical demands which 
teachers must normally face.
The District Court held that pregnant school teacher 
sufficiently sustained burden of showing reasonable likelihood 
of success in attacking school board's maternity leave policies 
on equal protection grounds. He granted a preliminary injunc­
tion.
A mandatory maternity leave was in question in Green v. 
Waterford Board of Education, No. 213, Docket 72-1676, 473 
F.2d 629 (2nd Cir. 1972). Priscilla B. Green, a teacher, was 
required to take a leave of absence from her job when she 
reached six months of her pregnancy. The rule by the School 
Board required a maternity leave without pay to begin not less 
than four months. The United States District Court for the 
District of Connecticut, M. Joseph Blumenfeld, Chief Judge,
349 F. Supp. 687, dismissed complaint on the merits, and 
plaintiff appealed.
Green argued that the Board's inflexible maternity leave 
provision denied her the equal protection of the law. In early 
September 1971, Green was a nontenured teacher of English at 
Waterford High School under a one-year employment contract.
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She informed the principal; that she was pregnant, that her date 
was about mid-February, 1972, and that she wanted to continue 
teaching until January 31, 1972. The Superintendent of Schools 
told plaintiff that her leave would start as soon as a suitable 
replacement could be found.
The Court decided that Mrs. Green's complaint stated a 
denial of equal protection of the laws and that summary judg­
ment for defendants be granted. The amount of damages, if any, 
to which Green was entitled remains to be determined. The 
Court remanded and reversed the decision.
Another pregnancy case to be discussed was Guelich v. 
Mounds View Independent Public School District, No. 621, 334 F. 
Supp 1276 (D.Minn. 1972) . An action was brought under the 
Civil Rights Act with respect to maternity leave policy of 
school district. The maternity leave policy in which Janet 
Guelich complained provided:
The employee shall apply for a leave of absence no later 
than four months previous to the expected date of normal 
birth of the child...The employee must begin her leave 
no later than three months prior to the expected date of 
normal birth of the child.
On motion to dismiss, the District Court held that since 
the policy had been replaced by a new policy eliminating the 
provisions complained of, and there was no reasonable expecta­
tion that the wrong would be repeated, claims for declaratory 
and injunctive relief were mooted. Furthermore, the School 
Board was of a "person" against whom damages could be recovered.
93
and that action solely for damages could not be maintained 
against individual members of the Board. The summary judgment 
for defendants granted.
A case litigated under the Fourteenth Amendment was 
Danielson v. Board of Higher Education, 4 FEP 885 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). A man and his wife, who were on the staff of a univer­
sity as lecturers, maintained an action against the University 
claiming a denial of equal protection of the laws by the opera­
tion of a leave policy which did not provide pay for families 
during maternity leave and did not allow males leave time for 
time spent caring for a newborn infant. The allegations of 
sex discrimination against both the man and wife presented a 
claim on which relief could be granted upon a proper showing 
(42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983).
Ross Danielson, a lecturer in sociology at City College, 
challenged the constitutionality of defendants' maternity leave 
provision. He claimed that women faculty members are permitted 
to talte a leave of absence in connection with pregnancy, up to 
three semester and the same child care leave privilege was 
denied to men. Mr. Danielson's wife, Susan, who was a lecturer 
in English at Lehman College, another branch of the City Uni­
versity of New York, challenged the constitutionality of 
defendants' refusal to treat her 12 day leave, during which she 
gave birth to a child, as sick leave.
The Court stated that summary judgment cannot be granted 
for either part. The case was dismissed.
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Reinhardt: v. Board of Education, 6 FEP 235 (3rd. Cir.
1973), was a case involving sex discrimination, discharge, and 
pregnancy. Elizabeth Ann Reinhardt filed her complaint under 
the Administrative Review Act. The School Board filed an 
answer. But on April 26, 1972 the School Board voted to dis­
charge Reinhardt, because the teacher had taken a leave of 
absence from her teaching position due to her pregnancy, and 
that she had anticipated resuming her teaching on March 1,
1972. The School Board dismissed the teacher on the grounds of 
immorality.
The teacher requested a hearing by the School Board, and 
the School Board requested that said hearing be made public.
The hearing lasted for two days. The teacher had been employed 
for 12 years and was on tenure. She became married on December 
4, 1971 and gave birth to a child on January 15, 1972. The 
school district caused her to be subjected to public scorn and 
ridicule and parents stated that they would not permit her to 
teach their children.
The Court declared that:
The board of education that unlawfully discharged pregnant 
unmarried teacher is ordered (1) to reinstate teacher to her 
former tenured position, (2) to pay teacher all money, 
including summer salaries, that she would have earned during 
period of discharge, minus her earnings from other employ­
ment during this period, and (3) to remove from its per­
sonnel and employment that records all mention of any 
disciplinary action or wrongful conduct on part of teacher.
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Another case involving a man and his wife in regards to 
maternity and child care leave was Ackerman v. Board of Education 
of the City of New York, No. 71 Civ. 5106, 372 F.Supp. 274 (S.D. 
N.Y., 1974).
A man former teacher and his wife brought action challeng­
ing constitutionality of Board of Education regulation which 
provided for maternity and child care leave for female teachers 
but under which plaintiff teacher had been denied leave when his 
wife had a baby. On motion of Ackerman's for class action de­
termination and partial summary judgment and of the Board of 
Education for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the 
District Ct. Bonsai, J., held that class action was not appro­
priate, where only one other male teacher had applied for child 
care leave prior to amendment to the regulation which relieved 
it of the legal infirmity. The motions were denied.
Francine E. Black and Kathleen M. Lane, both tenured 
teachers whose employment had been terminated, brought declar­
atory suits against school committee and Superintendent of Schools 
in which questions were raised with regard to committee's rule 
pertaining to maternity leave. Teachers sought reinstatement 
with back pay in Black v. School Committee of Malden, 310 N.E.
2d 330 (Sup.Ct.Mass.1974).
The ladies were engaged as teachers by the Malden school 
department in September, 1964, and after September, 1967, they 
qualified for tenure. It should be noted that their pregnan­
cies occurred in late June or early July, 1968. Early in 
November, 1968, they informed the Superintendent of Schools
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that they were pregnant and requested leaves of absence on that 
account to commence on January 2, 1969. In response to these 
requests the school committee voted at its meeting on November 
12, 1968 to accept the resignations of both, December, 1968.
The rules of the school district provided" that a married 
teacher must resign her position at the end of the fourth month 
of pregnancy and was not eligible for reinstatement until six 
months after the birth of her child. Both women worked until 
January 31, 1969, since neither turned in the requested resig­
nation. Both took sick leave pay for 13 days after the last 
day of work. The teachers did not press the issue of pregnancy 
but noted that they were being dismissed and both were tenured 
teachers.
The Superior Court found that dismissals to be illegal, 
ordered reinstatement and awarded teachers back pay, and de­
fendants appealed. The Superior Judicial Court held that the 
rules of the school district were unconstitutional.
Betty J. Buckley brought a civil rights suit in regards 
to her dismissal due to pregnancy. There were also allegations 
that Mrs. Buckley's race was a factor in the application of 
dismissal since white teachers were not subjected to dismissal 
in every instance. Regulations required dismissal of teachers 
at end of sixth month of pregnancy. The suit was brought under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of 1871, and of 1964, Title VII.
The specific conclusions and reasons of the trial court 
are as follows :
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The Court is of the opinion that there was no discrimina­
tion against Plaintiff either because of race or sex; 
that the rule regarding pregnancy is reasonable and applies 
to all women; that the Civil Rights Act applied only to 
persons of a class who were helpless to prevent becoming 
a member of that class. Women are such a class; they are 
not responsible for their sex; they did not choose it. 
Pregnant women do not constitute such a class; they are 
only a segment of a class (Buckley v. Coyle Public School 
System, No. 72-1520, 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir.1973).
The United States District Court for the Western District 
of Oklahoma rendered summary judgment for defendants, and plain­
tiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held that claim as to 
validity of school system policy terminating teacher's employ­
ment at the end of the sixth month of pregnancy presented con­
stitutional issues of sufficient substance to justify hearing 
on merits, and it was error to grant summary judgment for de­
fendants. The judgment was reversed.
In Freeport Area School District v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, No. 152 
C.D. 335 A.2d 873 (Commw. Ct.Pa. 1974), the Human Relations 
Commission held that the policy violated the Human Relations 
Act, and the school district appealed. The Act declared that it 
was unlawful for an employer to discriminate by reasons of sex 
with respect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment.
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Linda Szul, a teacher in the district since 19 59, applied 
for maternity leave giving April 7, 1973, as the likely date 
of birth. The district notifed Mrs. Szul that her leave was 
to commence December 23, 1973 which was three and one half 
months before the predicted date of birth. Szul informed the 
Board that she desired to remain on the job through February 9,
1973. Mrs. Szul filed a complaint with the Human Relations 
Commission alleging discrimination on the basis of sex.
After this complaint was served to the School Board the 
Commission heard the testimony of Karen Harrison, Mary Ippolito, 
and Darlaine Thompson. These were other district teachers who 
had taken maternity leaves, although these people did not file 
complaints. The Commission concluded as a matter of law that 
the district's maternity leave policy was discriminatory in 
requiring termination of employment 33g months before predicted 
birth, and in not making full time reemployment available 
when affected employees are physically able to resume their 
duties. The Commission directed payment of lost pay not only 
to Mrs. Szul, who filed a complaint, but also to Mrs. Harrison, 
Mrs. Ippolito and Mrs. Thompson who had not.
The Court decided that since the time period when teachers 
should leave was a part of collective bargaining agreement be­
tween the school district and the teachers' representative, 
these provisions are reasonable and permissible.
In Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Board of Education, No.
C 74-2029, 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D.Iowa. 1975), Charlene Sale 
instituted an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
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of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972. Sale claimed that she was discriminated against in the 
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" 
on the basis of sex. The central issue raised by the Board of 
Education was whether a cause of action lay under the statute 
for failure to pay sick leave benefits to women employees 
whose absence from work was solely caused by normal pregnancy.
On Board of Education's motion to dismiss, the District Court 
held that denial of such leave pay solely for pregnancy consti­
tuted the establishment of differentials in compensation or 
terms of employment prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 since only females are biologically capable of 
becoming pregnant. The denial of motion to dismiss involved a 
controlling question of law as to which there was substantial 
ground for differences of opinion thereby justifying immediate 
certification of appeal from order.
An action was brought by a female school teacher for 
declaratory judgment for damages for failure of the School Board 
to grant sick leave benefits for normal pregnancy in Hutchison 
V .  Lake Oswego School District, No. 7, Nos. 74-3181, 74-3182,
519 F .2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975). The case involved a sick leave 
policy which excludes from coverage absences related to preg­
nancy or childbirth.
Barbara Hutchison was employed for two school years by ' 
the school district as a part-time junior high school teacher.
On January 27, 1973, she gave birth to a child, necessitating 
her absence from work for 15 working days. She suffered no
1 00
complications as a result of either her pregnancy or childbirth. 
Upon her return to work, she requested that she be allowed sick 
leave benefits for her absence. She had accrued 15 days sick 
leave at this time. The School Board refused her request. They 
stated that pregnancy was not deemed to be an "illness or in­
jury" but rather a temporary disability permitting leave without 
pay. This interpretation was rendered by the Superintendent of 
the Lake Oswego Schools and concurred in by the Director of 
Legal and Executive Services. The sum of $339.59 was deducted 
from Hutchison's wages because of her absence from her job and 
the necessity of hiring a replacement during her absence.
After exhausting all possible administrative remedies, 
she brought the present suit seeking a declaration that the 
school district's maternity leave policy constituted sex dis­
crimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
19 64. The District Court dismissed the school district on the 
basis of sovereign immunity, but found that the School Board 
and its individual members had engaged in unlawful sex dis­
crimination in violation of both the Equal Protection Clause 
and Title VII. The Court of Appeals held that school district 
policy denying sick leave benefits for normal pregnancy did not 
violate equal protection but was violative of Civil Rights Act, 
that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suit against the 
Oregon school district whose financing largely came from local 
sources and that the school board members were entitled to 
qualified good-faith immunity from liability for damages. The 
case was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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The last case regarding pregnancy was Berg v. Richmond 
Unified School District, No. 74-1457, 11 FEP 1285 (9th Cir. 
1975). When Mrs. Berg, a school teacher employed by Richmond 
Unified School District, became pregnant the School District 
and its officers threatened to:
(1) require her to cease working on a date earlier than 
she and her physician believed necessary
(2) deny her the benefit of accumulated sick leave pay 
while she was not working.
Therefore, in the fifth month of her pregnancy, Mrs. Berg filed 
with the EEOC a charge of discrimination based on sex. About 
two months later, plaintiff requested the EEOC to issue a right 
to sue letter. She waited in vain for about à month and then 
commenced a class action in the district court under the pur­
ported authority of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal constitution. She con­
tinued to teach until the day before her child was born. Mean­
time, the EEOC did issue its letter, and plaintiff supplemented 
her complaint. The Court held that the school district's ex­
clusion of pregnancy- or childbirth-related disabilities from 
sick leave coverage was a Title VII violation.
Incompetency was used in the past to identify the school 
district's disapproval of pregnancy. The proper procedure was 
for ladies who were pregnant to leave the school setting early 
in the stages of pregnancy (Appeal of School District of City 
of Bethlehem).
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School districts forced pregnant women to take leave due 
to their belief that it was best for the women involved. The 
woman was also not allowed employment until a specific time 
after the baby's birth (La Fleur v. Cleveland Board of Educa­
tion and Freeport Area School District v. Commonwealth 
Pennsylvania). The school district wanted to protect the teach­
er's health and assure that the instructional program in the 
classroom was continued.
In the early 1970's, the courts upheld the school's posi­
tion that pregnant women should be relieved after the fifth or 
sixth month of pregnancy (LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Educa­
tion and Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School District). With 
the same circumstances but with different cases, the court went 
through an era of deciding in favor of mandatory maternity 
leaves (Cohen v. Chesterfield, Williams v. San Francisco Unified 
School District, and Green v. Waterford Board of Education).
Two interesting cases involving married couples who re­
quested that the man take maternity leave to take care of the 
new born baby were Danielson v. Board of Higher Education and 
Ackerman v. Board of Education of the City of Mew York. Although 
both cases were dismissed, discrimination not only applies to 
women, but to men as well. The sterotype definition of dis­
crimination covers only the female sex.
Pregnancy poised a very big issue. The problem of whether 
to consider pregnancy as an illness for sick leave reasons was 
not decided in the court cases. Discrimination exists when 
women who are qualified and competent individuals were forced
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to leave positions with no guarantee of reinstatement after 
the birth of their child (Black v. School Committee of Malden, 
Buckley v. Coyle Public School System, and Sale v. Waverly- 
Shell Rock Board of Education). The analysis of judicial 
responses to laws and practices that single out pregnant women 
for discriminatory treatment focuses on an incomplete under­
standing of one form of sex discrimination affecting all women 
(Bartlett, 1973).
The preceding were four major categories of cases. These 
four included the recurrent subjects involved in the court 
cases researched affecting women in educational positions.
Often cases overlapped into other categories. With each case 
a particular point emphasized a specific category in the study. 
The following will be answers to questions posed earlier in 
this study.
Influence of Courts on Hiring Practices
In a recent study entitled Wanted: More Women; Sex 
Differentiation in Public School Administration, Patricia Ann 
Schmuck explained, "The most often cited reasons against the 
hiring of women in any position in education has been concern 
that a woman will become pregnant and leave the job"(1975, 
p. 26). East Stroudsburg Area School District made this 
point when they based their termination policy on its previous 
unsuccessful experience with maternity leaves because several 
teachers had decided not to return to work following such 
leaves (Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School District).
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Traditional hiring practices have consistently favored 
men for positions in secondary and higher education. This 
traditional hiring practice is a sex-typing of occupations as 
presented by Suzanne Howard (1975). Some are known "male," 
and others are known as "female." Only 10% of American occu­
pations are held by both men and women, the remainder are 
filled predominantly by either men or women (Dreeban, 1970, 
p.24). Cynthia Epstein in Women's Place stated that "Men rank 
first in the ranking of the sexes and they get the first-ranking 
jobs. Women rank second and lowest and get the second and low­
est-ranking jobs (1971, p.162)." As an example, the plaintiffs 
in league of Academic Women v. Regents of the University of 
California pursued action seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief against regents of the University of California to pre­
vent them from continuing to discriminate in hiring and employ­
ment on the basis of sex.
Some acts of discrimination ceased when Title VII, 42 
U.S.C. section 2000e-2 (a) of the Civil Rights Act was amended. 
The important section outlawing sex discrimination in employ­
ment states, in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or
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(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees 
or applicants for employment in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities..or otherwise adverely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.
Selene Weise and Jo Davis Mortenson attempted to use pro­
visions of Title VII in charges of sex discrimination against 
the University. Title VII's amendment regarding sex went into 
effect after the plaintiff's charges of discrimination. 
Therefore, this discrimination was not covered by the Act 
(Weise & Mortenson v. Syracuse University).
Recent court decisions have made employers more aware of 
discriminatory practices. "The issue is not whether the 
practices will be eliminated, but whether long and antagonis­
tic battles will be required to enforce the law" (Hallam, 1973, 
p. 131) .
Categories Prompting Litigation 
The question of discrimination has affected many female 
employees within the educational institutions. Areas that 
are most likely to be discriminating, based on past court de­
cisions, include practices and policies of recruitment, 
selection, hiring, placement, promotion, testing, benefits, 
wages, terms and conditions of employment, advertising, dis­
charge, seniority, and many other basic terms and conditions 
of employment.
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Other situations which the courts might declare discrimin­
atory will never appear, women who experience discriminatory 
practices at their positions hesitate to pursue litigation be­
cause of their fear of reprisal. As it was stated in Adminis­
trative Positions in Public Education by Niedermayer and 
Kramer:
Not only is the legal route often a long one, it is a 
frightening one for many individuals. Not everyone will 
be willing to take it. However, it does provide a way 
for both individuals and professional groups to seek 
remedies.
Decisions Antagonistic to Women's Rights 
The majority of cases in this study dealing with discrimi­
nation were dismissed by the courts. Several factors prompted 
this action including the fact that the amended Title VII did 
not come into effect until 1972. Prior to this date acts of 
discrimination in public employment were judged under the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Braden 
V .  University of Pittsburgh, Pace College v. Commission on 
Human Rights of the City of New York, and Morey v. Independent 
School District).
Discrimination, even when it did exist, was very difficult 
to prove through litigation. The court system has demonstrated 
a reluctancy to interfere with areas of the educational system 
(Nordin, 1975). As the United States Supreme Court noted in 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct.266, 21 L.Ed. 2d 
228 (1968):
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Judicial interposition in the operation of the public 
school system of the Nation raises problems requiring 
care and restraint...Courts do not and cannot intervene 
in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily 
operation of school systems and which do not directly 
and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.
Another antagonistic Court practice is the lack of a uni­
versal meaning of the word discrimination. Niedermayer and 
Kramer explained;
The term "discrimination” tends to arouse anger and 
defensiveness in those who consider themselves men of 
good will. Many women also deny or fail to recognize 
it..." (1974, p.13).
Discrimination against female professionals occurs accord­
ing to Theordore in The Professional Woman, "when females of 
equivalent qualifications, experience, and performance as 
males do not share equality in the decision-making process nor 
receive equal rewards" (1971, p. 27).
One of the few cases won by plaintiffs in the litigation 
discussed was Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh. The case 
involved a question of whether tenure was denied to Dr. Sharon 
Johnson because of sex discrimination. The court restrained 
the University from discharging her, stating, "The discharge 
and refusal of tenure on June 30, 19 73, will, under the cir­
cumstances of this case, amount to such discrimination"
(Johnson v. University Pittsburgh). The difficulty in labeling 
discrimination was stated within the same case:
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It is obvious that -'in a case of sex discrimination, as 
in a case of race discrimination, we very seldom find a 
resolution of a board of directors or a faculty committee 
agreeing to engage in sex discrimination any more than 
we would expect to find the same in a conspiracy to 
violate the antitrust laws. The existence of such dis­
crimination must therefore be found from circumstantial 
evidence and inferences from the circumstances (Johnson v. 
University of Pittsburgh).
Another example was Stevens v. Junior College District 
of St. Louis, in which Agnes E. Stevens lost her case because 
she could not prove her claim of employment discrimination.
Judgment was to the defendant at plaintiff's cost. This 
particular court case included race and sex discrimination.
Still other rulings by courts which were antagonistic to 
women dealt with pregnancy. There is a difference of opinion 
as to whether maternity leave should be comparable to other 
leaves of medical illnesses. Teachers on illness leave are 
allowed to draw pay for their sick leave days while pregnant 
teachers are not. Pregnant teachers get no seniority for the 
period of their leave; however, those on leave for illness do. 
Gains in the area are being made, and some decisions ruled in 
favor of pregnancy such as in the following example :
...the basis of plaintiff's action was that a mandatory 
maternity leave provision for teachers which fails to 
consider the physical ability of the individual and treats 
pregnancy differently from any other form of disability
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deprives a pregnant teacher of rights guaranteed under 
the Fourteenth Amendment" (Green v. Waterford Board of 
Education).
In 1970, the Presidentially appointed Citizens' Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women adopted the following statement 
of principles:
Childbearing and complications of pregnancy are, for all 
job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should 
be treated as such under any health insurance, temporary 
disability insurance, or sick leave plan or an employer 
(or) union. Any policies or practices of an employer or 
union, written or unwritten, applied to instances of 
temporary disability other than pregnancy should be applied 
to incapacity due to pregnancy or childbirth, including 
policies or practices relating to leave of absence, 
restoration or recall or duty, and seniority. No addition­
al or different benefits or restrictions should be applied 
to disability because of pregnancy or childbirth, and no 
pregnant woman employee should be in a better position in
relation to job-related practices or benefits than an
employee similarly situated suffering from other disability 
(Women and the Law, 1976, p. 20).
In Buckley v. Coyle Public School System the court stated
that regulations of School Boards regarding pregnancy penalizes 
the female school teacher for being a woman, and the regulations 
should be condemned. "Since only females are biologically cap­
able of becoming pregnant, denying sick leave pay solely for
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pregnancy seems clearly to be setting up differentials in the 
compensation or terms of employment prohibited Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act" (Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Board of 
Education).
Some ruling were antagonstic to women because the women 
introduced cases in courts without following proper procedure.
In Keller v. University, Janet Jackson Keller brought charges 
against the University of Michigan in an EEOC complaint and 
accused other defendants not named in charge filed by the EEOC 
in the District Court. This is an example of why many cases 
involving women are dismissed. The court system relies heavily 
on administrative procedure. Even if discrimination existed in 
the institution, the process involved in filing the case appears 
to be more significant to the judge than the charge itself.
Still another example was Queensborough Community College v. 
State Human Rights Appeal Board. In this case, Ms. Marenco's 
discrimination complaint was filed with the State Division of 
Human Rights 12 months after the deadline period. The com­
plaint dealt with her notice that she would not be reappointed 
as an assistant professor at Queensborough Community College. 
Both of these cases were dismissed.
The last issue to be discussed in the decisions that were 
antagonistic to women's rights is "incompetency." Hattie M. 
Blunt was dismissed by the School Board on incompetency even 
though she had received satisfactory evaluations for 25 years 
(Blunt V. Marion County School Board).
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"Incompetency" is a relative term without technical mean­
ing which may be employed as meaning disqualification, inability, 
incapacity, lack of ability, legal qualification, or fitness to 
discharge the required duty. Within Appeal of School District 
of City of Bethlehem the court found the plaintiff, Mrs. Brown, 
incompetent as stated below:
We must bear in mind that Mrs. Brown was not being dis­
criminated against because of her marriage, which occurred 
long prior to the events we have recited. Her dismissal 
was due neither to that fact nor to her legitmate pregnan­
cy, but because she became incompetent due to her physical 
incapacity to discharge her duties.
Another teacher, Elizabeth Soucy, was dismissed by her new 
principal because of "incompetency." She had been employed in 
the school for 21 years. The courts ordered reinstatement 
(Soucy V .  Board of Education of North Colonie Central School 
District).
Fundamental Issues Presented in Litigation 
Each case cited in this study was unique in that it presented 
issues that were unparalled by another case. For instance, the 
concept of due process was challenged in several cases (Regents, 
University of Colorado v. Civil Rights Commission and Gray v.
Union Co. Intermediate Ed. Districts). Justice Frankfurter 
commented on the elusiveness of due process in Gifis' Law 
Dictionary:
...Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not 
a yardstick. It is a delicate process of adjustment
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inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those 
whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of 
the process (U.S. 123, 162-163 (1975, p. 66).
Lola Beth Green in Gray v. Union County maintained that 
the School Board's failure to provide her with a fair and mean­
ingful hearing before deciding to terminate her employment de­
prived her of "liberty" without due process of law. In Board 
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 
(1972), the Supreme Court made it clear that the requirements 
of procedural due process apply when a teacher is being deprived 
of his job, if such action would result in a loss of "liberty" 
or "property."
Filling a position with a man when a qualified woman is 
available for a position is another area precipitating litiga­
tion. Cleo Calage was denied appropriate payment and promotion 
in Calage v. University of Tennessee. Cleo Calage in a Title 
VII suit claimed that she and other females were denied pro­
motions because of sex. Calage was denied equal payment and 
recognition when she was given the responsibilities of two 
positions when her immediate superior transferred to another 
university. Judgment was for the defendant. In another case 
Selene Weise was turned down for employment at Syracuse Univer­
sity in favor of an allegedly less-qualified male (Weise v. 
Syracuse University).
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Tufts also in­
volved the appointment of tenure to a less qualified male with­
out a doctorate over two qualified women, one of whom had a
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Ph.D. degree. Joost, one of the plaintiffs felt that she was 
discriminated against because "larger salaries were paid men 
in the Department. . ." (EEOC v. Tufts Institution of Learning.)
The efforts to change employment patterns for women are 
part of a larger social concern. Yet, the socialization pro­
cess will take longer primarily because traditional male and 
female roles are so firmly entrenched in the attitudes of 
American society. Still, the legal and social movements have 
begun and both have gained sufficient momentum at this point 
that some resemblance of equality between men and women may be 
expected (Miller, 1974). Few observers of the educational 
system will deny that it needs all the talent and commitment 
available. Women educators constitute a source of vastly under­
utilized talent (Niedermayer and Kramer, 1974).
Moreover, another fundamental issue challenged by the 
educator is the term nepotism. In 1974, New York State Supreme 
Court ordered the State University of New York to reinstate 
speech professor Joan Sanbonmatsu as a member of the staff of 
State University College at Brockport. Dr. Sanbonmatsu, whose 
husband was a tenured faculty member, had been given a "tem­
porary" appointment, rather than a more desirable "term" 
appointment because of the University's antinepotism rule which 
prohibited husband and wife and other closely related persons 
from being regular members of the college staff at the same 
time. In a unanimous decision in the case, the court found 
that the "anti-nepotism rule had been applied unevenly and had 
resulted in discrimination against women" and that the "nepotism
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rule was discriminatory, unnecessary, and served no job-related 
purpose" (Sanbonmatsu v. Boyer).
Litigation; An Avenue for Change 
In recent years, possibly because of a general rekindling 
of interest in the status of women in society and the emergence 
of positive corrective legislation in the field, constitutional 
challenges of laws that discriminate on grounds of sex have in­
creased. In other words, more women are identifying discrimi­
natory practices in their positions and are pursuing litigation 
so that change will occur in their personal situations. This 
could be due to the more recent litigation that has won judg­
ment for females.
The most recent decision handed down by the United States 
Supreme Court was in regards to pregnancy. Although it does 
not speak of education directly, it should have an indirect 
influence on future decisions involving educators. In December, 
1976, the United States Supreme Court stated that a company's 
disability and sick leave programs did not have to include 
coverage for pregnancy (General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, Nos. 7 4- 
1589 and 74-1590, 97 S. Ct. 201 (Sup. Ct. 1976). The case 
stated:
...the rule at issue places the risk of absence caused by 
pregnancy in a class by itself. By definition, such a 
rule discriminates on account of sex; for it is the 
capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates 
the female from the male. The analysis is the same 
whether the rule relates to hiring, promotion, the
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acceptability of an excuse for absence, or an exclusion 
from a disability insurance plan.
The avenue for change in this area is that as the number 
of constitutional challenges to the sex-based discrimination 
multiply, the likelihood that the United States Supreme Court, 
the final arbitrator of Federal Constitutional disputes, will 
agree to review lower state or Federal court decisions 
(Kanowitz, 1968). This would definitely be an advantage for 
women because lower courts would have to investigate thoroughly 
the activities of educational institutions.
Women's legal and social emanicipation is far from complete 
as noted by more cases entering the courts dealing with employ­
ment discrimination and the present problems and popularity of 
the subject of equal rights.
If the partial emancipation of women to date has had an 
unsettling effect upon the psychological stability of both 
men and women, a certain amount of this may be inevitable; 
change and instability are in many respects synonymous.
On the other hand, the psychological problems presumably 
resulting from such changes may merely reflect the very 
incompleteness of women's legal emancipation and the fact 
that it is still an ongoing process...both men and women 
will be able to recognize themselves for what they have 
always been— people. The psychological well-being of our 
total population may therefore be the most important single 
reason for getting on with the job of erasing all remaining
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pockets of legal and social inequality between the sexes
(Kanowitz, 1968, pp. 202-203).
In the past it has appeared that women were unconcerned 
with the problem of sex-based legal discrimination. But there 
are many indications that the situation is changing rapidly, 
especially with the increasing frequency with which sex- 
discriminatory legal rules are being challenged on the basis 
of constitutional doctrine.
Rule of State and Federal Legislation
During the last few years, sexual imbalance in many areas 
of employment has been recognized. Major steps have been taken 
which seek to remedy this condition through Federal and state 
laws, executive orders, city ordinances, and resulting litiga­
tion, settlements, and affirmative action. One major step was 
when the Department of Health, Education and Welfare first 
blocked new government contracts to four major universities in 
1970 because of their inequitable treatment of women. After 
7.5 million dollars in Federal contracts were stalled by HEW 
at a major university in the early 1970s, the nation's first 
affirmative action program was written. Superficially, at 
least, it was one of the first model plans for achieving job 
equality for women (Sassower, 1972).
Discrimination, whether social, legal or both, not only 
stunts the personal development of the individuals but nurtures 
the development of traits and characteristics that would be 
deemed undesirable and unworthy (Kanowitz, 1968). Such
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differences in treatment have often been challenged 
in the courts as alleged violations of state or Federal con­
stitutional provisions. But these constitutional attacks have 
met with failure, leading to, among other things, persistent 
pressure for a Federal constitutional amendment that would 
specifically prohibit legal discrimination based on sex.
However, the widespread reluctance of individuals to admit 
that discrimination has occurred is likely to prevent equal 
employment opportunity. In any event, women in education now 
have the tools to eradicate discriminatory practices. They and 
their organizational representatives should use these tools 
whenever necessary.
Summary of Findings
Questions posed in this study with accompanying answers 
are as follows:
1. What influence have court decisions had on traditional 
hiring practices?
The court decisions analyzed had no significant influence 
on educational institutions' attitudes toward their hiring 
practices.
2. What were the general categories or areas of concern 
that have prompted litigation?
The four main categories of the study included promotion 
and tenure, appointment, dismissal, and pregnancy.
3. What court rulings were antagonistic to women's 
rights?
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The fact that most court cases were dismissed was 
antagonistic to women's rights. Court decisions regarding 
pregnancy issues were also antagonistic because women were 
singled out and were required to leave their positions because 
of mandatory maternity leave policies.
4. What fundamental issues were presented in litigation 
regarding rights for women?
Throughout the litigation studied, women felt that they 
were not given equal employment opportunities. Women challenged 
in court cases equal pay, equal privileges, equal conditions, 
and equal opportunities.
5. What relationships existed between positions in secon­
dary and higher education for women and litigation as an avenue 
for change?
A relationship was not found between women in secondary 
and higher educational positions in regard to litigation. Ex­
cluding pregnancy cases, more women in higher educational posi­
tions pursued litigation; women in the secondary schools need 
to be less fearful of the court systems as an avenue for change.
6. What role did state and Federal legislation play in 
the litigation procedure?
In reference to legislation. Title VII was used most fre­
quently by women with job discrimination problems. The Four­
teenth Amendment was also referred to in court cases dealing 
with discriminatory charges.
CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION, AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary
The problem for this investigation was to analyze litigation 
and to examine its implications for the employment of women in 
secondary and higher educational professions. Questions posed 
in this study with accompanying answers are as follows ;
1. What influence have recent court decisions had on 
traditional hiring practices?
The court decisions analyzed had no significant influence 
on educational institutions; attitudes toward their hiring 
practices.
2. What were the general categories or areas of concern 
that have prompted litigation?
The four main categories of the study included promotion 
and tenure, appointment, dismissal, and pregnancy.
3. What court rulings were antagonistic to women's rights?
The fact that most court cases were dismissed was antago­
nistic to women's rights. Court decisions regarding pregnancy 
issues were also antagonistic because women were singled out and 
were required to leave their positions because of mandatory 
maternity leave policies.
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4. What fundamental issues were presented in litigation 
regarding rights for women?
Throughout the litigation studied, women felt that they 
were not given equal employment opportunities. Women challenged 
in court cases equal pay, equal privileges, equal conditions, 
and equal opportunities.
5. What relationships existed between positions in sec­
ondary and higher education for women and litigation as an 
avenue for change?
A relationship was not found between women in secondary 
and higher educational positions in regard to litigation. Ex­
cluding pregnancy cases, more women in higher educational posi­
tions pursued litigation; women in the secondary schools need 
to be less fearful of the court systems as an avenue for change.
5. What role did state and Federal legislation play in 
the litigation procedure?
In reference to legislation. Title VII was used most fre­
quently by women with job discrimination problems. The Four­
teenth Amendment was also referred to in court cases dealing 
with discriminatory charges.
Certain limitations were placed upon the available lit­
erature and litigation concerning women. The first limitation 
was that the research and literature studied related only to 
historical-legal matters dealing with women in or seeking posi­
tions in education. The second limitation was that judicial 
decisions analyzed were those in the United States District 
Courts and state and Federal Appellate Courts, including the
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United States Supreme Court as reported in the National 
Reporter System.
The study involved a historical-legal search of literature 
bearing upon the rights of women in secondary and higher edu­
cational professions. The procedure associated with the col­
lection of related materials involved the location, examination, 
and analysis of published materials in libraries and various 
governmental agencies. The source of reference was the United 
States Constitution, as any reference to the laws of the United 
States are bound together by this document. The original case 
materials, legal periodicals, and state and Federal statutes 
were analyzed for content and importance. Relative questions 
were asked of each case studied. Only a cross section of court 
cases dealing with women in secondary and higher education in­
volving job discrimination were included.
The compilation of cases involving litigation of women 
employed in secondary and higher educational institutions evi­
denced the fact that job discrimination practices do exist. 
Whether the reasons for such litigation rest with problems with­
in the educational system itself, ambiguity in the courts, or 
a need for change in attitudes toward women in professional 
situations, was not under scrutiny. However, an awareness of 
job discrimination practices is vital to the successful future 
of women educators in all areas of endeavor.
Conclusion
The term discrimination has ambigious connotations in 
United States Courts. Discrimination, even when it does exist.
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was very difficult to prove. Discrimination in one court could 
be construed as nondiscrimination in another court. The word 
caused anger in some individuals, but more frequently made edu­
cators very defensive. Men, as well as women, deny or fail to 
recognize its existence.
Women have not had the appropriate legislation on which to 
rely. The role of state and Federal legislation in the litiga­
tion procedure was presented earlier in the study. The legis­
lative process has become very lengthy, expensive, and time 
consuming with no guarantee of success. Title VII seems to be 
the most appropriate piece of legislation with which to fight 
job discrimination in the courts. The First, Eleventh, and 
Fourteenth Amendments were used frequently, but the courts were 
not consistent with their interpretation of these Amendments. 
Title IX will soon change this pattern. Title IX identifies 
discrimination explicitly in Federally supported programs and 
will help bear some of the load carried by Title VII.
More women in higher education pursued court action than 
did women in the public schools (excluding pregnancy cases). 
This could be because of the job security that lies in the 
public schools or because women were accepted as equals in the 
public school more often than in higher education. However, 
one can readily see that more may be at stake in the higher 
institutions than in public school positions. Higher salaries, 
advanced degrees, and the time necessary to attain them have 
made the pursuit of litigation worth the effort.
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The question of how many cases did not reach litigation 
through the courts should be answered. The assumption was that 
administrators recognized valid points brought to them by 
women and dealt with them through administrative process rather 
than in the courts. Those that did go to court were cases 
administrators and women were unable to resolve out of court. 
One could conclude from some of the recent cases that the fail­
ure of arbitrations sent complaints to the courts. An honest 
assumption would be that women did not have valid complaints. 
This point can be substantiated by the fact that most rulings 
were against the women and their grievances.
The primary problem facing pregnant women in educational 
institutions was whether the institution would consider ma­
ternity leave within the sick leave policy. An important fact 
was that the degree to which pregnancy affects women's health 
and vitality varies enormously with the individual and the 
work. In all of the cases studied, the most gains were made in 
the area dealing with pregnancy. Many institutions had the 
approval of the courts for their mandatory maternity leave 
policies, and in the same time period other courts ridiculed 
mandatory maternity leave for women.
Discussion
Discrimination having been a term difficult to define by 
the courts was proven in very few instances (Johnson v. Uni­
versity of Pittsburgh and Cohen v. Chesterfield). In most 
circumstances evidence was insufficient to substantiate
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discrimination (Stevens v. Junior College District of St. Louis, 
Queensborough Community College v. State Human Rights Appeal 
Board, and Byron v. University of Florida). Niedermayer and 
Kramer (1974) agree that individuals in educational institu­
tions become defensive when approached by the accusation of 
discriminating acts and attitudes (Weise v. Syracuse University, 
Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, Shipley v. Fisk 
University, Calage v. University of Florida, and Regents of 
University of Colorado v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission).
As Kanowitz (1968) was quoted earlier in the paper, discrimin­
ation, whether social, legal, or both, not only stunts the 
personal development of the individuals, but nurtures the de­
velopment of traits and characteristics that would be deemed 
undesirable and unworthy. The widespread reluctance of indi­
viduals to admit that discrimination has occurred is likely to 
prevent equal employment opportunities for women.
Most cases in the study which dealt with discrimination 
were dismissed by the courts. Several factors prompted this 
action, including the fact that the amended Title VII did not 
come into effect until 1972. Prior to this date, several 
amendments were used as a defense for the complaint. One of 
these was the Fourteenth Amendment (Braden v. University of 
Pittsburgh, Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights of the 
City of New York, Danielson v. Board of Higher Education, and 
Morey v. Independent School District). Other amendments were 
presented, including the Eleventh Amendment (Byron v. University 
of Florida and Keller v. University of Michigan). Still another 
amendment used was the Fifth Amendment (Morey v. Independent
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School District, Pendrell v. Chatham College, and Duke v. North 
Texas State University). However, most of the cases studied 
used Title VII as their major legislation (Stevens v. Junior 
College District of St. Louis, Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 
Peters v. Middlebury College, Weise and Mortenson v. Syracuse 
University, Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Board of Education, and 
Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School District). In the past the 
Courts and legislation have not had much of an influence on the 
hiring practices of educational institutions in regard to women. 
Presently, with new legislation such as Title IX and Executive 
Orders, educational institutions need to change certain atti­
tudes of employers and present routine procedures in hiring 
practices in order to receive Federal funds. This new legisla­
tion has not been tested in the courts, but identifies the 
problem of discrimination more than in the past legislation.
The question of whether mandatory maternity leaves are to 
be accepted or not in educational institutions may still be 
undecided. Some courts justified sick leave being used for 
pregnancy as in Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School District. The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's policies relative to 
maternity and childbirth were that the employee may not be 
discriminated against because of pregnancy. One can assume 
that pregnancy issues have made greater gains because more cases 
were decided in favor of women (Cohen v. Chesterfield, Williams 
V .  San Francisco Unified School District, Reinhartd v. Board 
of Education and Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School District). 
However, some courts did rule in favor of mandatory maternity
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leave policies (Da Fleur v. Cleveland Board of Education and 
Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School District).
The most obvious conclusion was that women in the public 
schools did not seek court action as much as women in higher 
education in the areas of promotion and tenure, appointment, 
and dismissal (Soucy v. Board of Education, Harkless v. Sweeny 
Independent School District, Blunt v. Marion County School 
Board, and Pillion v. Board of Education of Pearl River School 
District). Women with educational positions in the public 
schools did pursue court action more than women in higher edu­
cational professions (Jones v. School District of Borough of 
Kulpmont, 1939, Walker v. School District City of Scranton,
1940, and Appeal of School District of City of Bethlehem, 1943).
Implications
Since court decisions are constantly being handed down, 
future research should include the current status of the liti­
gation regarding women in educational employment. More dis­
crimination occurs than is reported by the courts or shown 
by complaints made to various agencies.
Furthermore, since Title IX is one of the newest legal 
tools, it would be important to know its contribution to the 
rights of women. At present, educational institutions are in 
the process of establishing affirmative action approaches for 
their particular situations. A study evaluating its effective 
uses would be of value.
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Since this study included only a selection of cases 
involving women in education, a collection of all court cases 
would be helpful for further reference. A historical collec­
tion of all cases dealing with matters of education that 
women have tried in the courts would be an aid to college pro­
fessors, educational administrators, and other educators in 
evaluating their current situation as to compliance and admin­
istration.
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PART 1604 —  GUIDÈUNES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OE SEX
By virtue of the authority vested in it by section 713(b) of Title VII 
of the C\vil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S,C., section 2000e-12, 78 Stat.
265, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission hereby revises 
Title 29, Chapter XIV, § 1604 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
These Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex supersede and 
enlarge upon the Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, issued by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on December 2, 1965, and 
all amendments thereto. Because the material herein is interpretive in 
nature, the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C 553) 
requiring notice of proposed rule making, opportunity for public participa­
tion, and delay in effective date are inapplicable. The Guidelines shall be 
applicable to charges and cases presently pending or hereafter filed with 
the Commission.
Section 1604.1 General Principles.
(a) References to "employer", or "employers" in Part 1604 
state principles that are applicable not only to employers, but also to 
labor organizations and to employment agencies insofar as their action or 
inaction may adversely affect employment opportunities.
(b) To the extent that the views expressed in prior Commission 
pronouncements are inconsistent with the views expressed herein, such 
prior views are hereby overruled.
(c) The Commission will continue to consider particular problems 
relating to sex discrimination on a case-by-case basis.
Section 1604.2 Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification.
(a) The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational 
qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Labels -- 
"Men's jobs" and "Women's jobs" -- tend to deny employment opportunities 
unnecessarily to one sex or the other.
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations 
do not warrant the application of the bona fide occupational 
qualification exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her 
sex based on assumptions of the comparative employment 
characteristics of women in general. For example, the 
assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher 
than among men.
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(il) The refusal to hire an individual based on 
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. Such stereo­
types include, for example, that men are less capable of 
assembling intricate equipment; that women are less capable 
of aggressive salesmanship. The principle of non-discrimina­
tion requires that individuals be considered on the basis of 
individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics 
generally attributed to the group.
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the 
preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers 
except as covered specifically in subparagraph (2) of this 
paragraph.
(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or 
genuineness, the Commission ivill consider sex to be a bona fide . 
occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or actress.
(b) Effect of sex-oriented state employment legislation.
(1) Many States have enacted laws or promulgated 
administrative regulations with respect to the employment of 
females. Among these laws are those which prohibit or limit the 
employment of females, e. g. , the employment of females in certain 
occupations, in jobs requiring the lifting or carrying of weights 
exceeding certain prescribed limits, during certain hours of the 
night, for more than a specified number of hours per day or per 
week, and for certain periods of time before and after childbirth.
The Commission has found that such laws and regulations do not 
take into account the capacities, preferences, and abilities of 
individual females and, therefore, discriminate on the basis of sex. 
The Commission has concluded that such laws and regulations 
conflict with and are superseded by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Accordingly, such laws will not be considered a 
defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice 
or as a basis for the application of the bona fide occupational 
qualification exception.
(2) The Commission has concluded that state laws and 
regulations which discriminate on the basis of sex with regard to 
the employment of minors are in conflict with and are superseded 
by Title VII to the extent that such laws are more restrictive for 
one sex. Accordingly, restrictions on the employment of minors 
of one sex over and above those imposed on minors of the other 
sex will not be considered a defense to an otherwise established
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uiilawful employment practice or as a basis for the application of 
the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
(3) A  number of states require that minimum wage and 
premium pay for overtime be provided for female employees. An 
employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful employment 
practice if:
(i) It refuses to hire or otherwise adversely affects 
the employment opportunities of female applicants or employees 
in order to avoid the payment of minimum wages or overtime 
pay required by state law; or
(ii) It does not provide the same benefits for male 
employees.
(4) As to other kinds of sex-oriented state employment laws, 
such as those requiring special rest and meal periods or physical 
facilities for women, provision of these benefits to one sex only will 
be a violation, of Title VII, An employer will be deemed to have 
engaged in an unlawful employment practice if:
(i) It refuses to hire or otherwise adversely affects 
the employment opportunities of female applicants or 
employees in order to avoid the provision of such benefits; or
(ii) It does not provide the same benefits for male 
employees. If the employer can prove that business necessity 
precludes providing these benefits to both men and women, 
then the state law is in conflict with and superseded by Title 
VII as to this employer. In this situation, the employer shall 
not provide such benefits to members of either sex.
(5) Some states require that separate restrooms be 
provided for employees of each sex. An employer will be deemed 
to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if it refuses
to hire or otherwise adversely affects the employment opportunities 
of applicants or employees in order to avoid the provision of such 
restrooms for persons of that sex.
Section l604. 3 Separate Lines of Progression and Seniority Systems,
(a) It is an unlawful employment practice to classify a job as 
"male" or "female" or to maintain separate lines of progression or 
separate seniority lists based on sex where this would adversely affect
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any employee unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for that 
job. Accordingly, employment practices are unlawful which arbitrarily 
classify jobs so that:
(1) A  female is prohibited from applying for a job labeled 
"male, " or for a job in a "male" line of progression" and vice versa*
(2) A  male scheduled for layoff is prohibited from 
displacing a less senior female on a "female" seniority list; and 
vice versa.
(b) A  seniority system or line of progression which distinguishes 
between "light" and "heavy" jobs constitutes an unlawful employment 
practice if it operates as a disguised form of classification by sex, or 
creates unreasonable obstacles to the advancement by members of either 
sex into jobs which members of that sex would reasonably be expected to 
perform.
Section 1604.4 Discrimination Against Married Women.
(a) The Commission has determined that an employer's rule 
which forbids or restricts the employment of naarried women and which 
is not applicable to married men is a discrimination based on sex 
prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, It does not seem to us 
relevant that the rule is not directed against all females, but only against 
married females, for so long as sex is a factor in the application of the 
rule, such application involves a discrimination based on sex.
(b) It m ay be that under certain circumstances, such a rule could 
be justified within the meaning of Section 703(e)(1) of Title VII. W e  exprea 
no opinion on this question at this time except to point out that sex as a 
bona fide occupational qualification must be justified in terms of the 
peculiar requirements of the particular job and not on the basis of a 
general principle such as the desirability of spreading work.
Section 1604.5 Job Opportunities Advertising.
It is a violation of Title VII for a help - wanted advertisement to 
indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based 
on sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the 
particular job involved. The placement of an advertisement in columns 
classified by publishers on the basis of sex, such as columns headed 
"Male" or "Female, " will be considered an expression of a preference, 
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex.
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Section. 1604.6 Employment Agencies.
'(a.) Section 703(b) of the Civil Rights Act specifically states that 
it shall bë unlawful for an employment agency to discriminate against any 
individual because of sex. The Commission has determined that private 
employment agencies which deal exclusively with one sex are engaged in 
an unlawful employment practice, except to the extent that such agencies 
limit their services to furnishing employees for particular jobs for which 
sex ië a bona fide occupational qualification.
(b) An employment agency that receives a job order containing 
ah unlawful sex specification will share responsibility with the employer 
placing the job order if the agency fills the order knowing.that the sex 
specification is not based upon a bona fide occupational qualification. 
However i an employment agency will not be deemed to be in violation of the 
law, regardless of the determination as to the employer, if the agency 
does not have reason to believe that the employer's claim of bona fide 
occupations qualification is without substance and the agency makes and 
maintains a written record available to the Commission of each such
job order. Such record shall include the name of the employer, the 
description of the job and the basis for the employer's claim of bona fide 
occupational qualification.
(c) It is the responsibility of employment agencies to keep 
informed of opinions and decisions of the Commission on sex discrimina­
tion.
Section 1604.7 Pre-employment Inquiries as to Sex.
A  pre-employment inquiry m a y  ask "Male _^______, Female
‘ br "Mr. Mrs. Miss, " provided that the inquiry is made in
good faith for a non-discriminatory purpose. Any pre-employment inquiry 
in connection with prospective employment which expresses directly or 
indirectly any limitation, specification or discrimination as to sex shall 
be unlawful unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.
Section 1604.8 Relationship of Title VII to the Equal Pay Act.
(a) The employee coverage of the prohibitions against discrimina­
tion based on sex contained in Title VII is c o - extensive with that of the 
other prohibitions contained in Title VII and is not limited by Section 703(h) 
to those employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
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(b) By virtue of Section 703(h), a defense based on the Equal Pay 
Act may be raised in a proceeding under Title VII; , ;
(c) Where such a defense is raised the Commission will give 
appropriate consideration to the interpretations of the Administrator,
Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor, but will not be bound 
thereby.
Section 1604.9 Fringe Benefits.
(a) "Fringe benefits, " as used herein, includes niedical, hospital, 
accident, life insurance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus 
plans ; leave; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
to discriminate between men and women with regard to fringe benefits.
(c) Where an employer conditions benefits available to employees 
and their spouses and families on whether the employee is the "head of 
the household" or "principal wage earner" in the family unit, the benefits 
tend to be available only to male employees and their families. Due to 
the fact that such conditioning discriminatorily affects the rights of 
women employees, and that "head of household" or "principal wage earner" 
status bears no relationship to job performance, benefits which are so 
conditioned will be found a prima facie violation of the prohibitions 
against sex discrimination contained in the Act.
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practi ce for an employer 
to make available benefits for the wives and families of male employees 
where the same benefits are not made available for the husbands and 
families of female employees ; or to make available benefits for the wives 
of male employees which are not made available for female employees; or 
to make available benefits to the husbands of female employees which are 
not made available for male employees. An example of such an unlawful 
employment practice is a situation in which wives of male employees 
receive maternity benefits while female employees receive no such 
benefits.
(e) It shall not be a defense under Title VII to a charge of sex 
discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with 
respect to one sex than the other.
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(f) It shall bé an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
to have a pension or retirement plan which establishes different optional 
or compulsory retirement ages based on sex, or which differentiates in 
benefits on the basis of sex. A  statement of the General Counsel of 
September 13, 1968, providing for a phasing out of differentials with 
regard to optional retirement age for certain incumbent employees is 
hereby withdrawn.
Section 1604. 10 Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy and 
Childbirth.
(a) A  written or unwritten employment policy or practice which 
excludes from employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy 
is in prima facie violation of Title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, 
abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related 
purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any 
health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in 
connection with employment. Written and unwritten employment policies 
and practices involving matters such as the commencment and duration of 
leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other 
benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or 
temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, 
shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same 
terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily 
disabled is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no 
leave is available, such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate 
impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity.
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iM TLB  IX —P B O H IB IT IO K  O F  S E X  D ISC R IM IN A T IO N
' ' SEX DXSCRnaNATZON PROHIBITED
S ec. 901. (a ) No person in  the  U nited States shal], on the basis of 
sex, be e x c lu d e  from  partic ipation  in , be denied the benefits of, o r be 
subjected to  discrim ination under any education program  o r activity 
Exceptions. receiving Federal financial assistance, except th a t:
(1) in  regard  to  admissions to  educational institutions, th is  
sectioii shall app ly  only to  institutions o f vocational education, 
professional ed u c tio n , and  g raduate  higher education, and to 
public institutions o f undergraduate higher education ;
. (2 ) in  rega rd  to  admissions to  educational institutions, this 
section shall n o t apply (A ) fo r  one y ear from  the date o f enact­
m ent o f  th is  A ct, n o r fo r  six  years a fte r such date in  the case o f an  
educational institution which has begun the process o f changing 
from  being an  institu tion  w hich adm its only students o f one sex 
to b e i%  an  institution w hich adm its students o f both s e x ^  but 
only i f  i t  is  carry ing  o u t a  p lan  fo r such a  cha% e which is 
approved by  th e  Commissioner o f Education o r (B ) fo r  seven 
years from  th e  date a n  educational institution begins the  process o f 
changing from  being an  institu tion  which adm its only students 
o f only one sex to  bein^ an  institution which adm its students o f 
both sexes, b u t only i f  i t  is  carry ing  out a  plan fo r such a  change 
w hich is approved by the  Grnnmissioner ox Education, whichever 
is  th e  la te r;
(3) th is  section shall n o t app ly  to  an  educational institution 
w hich is controlled b y  a  religious organization i f  the application 
o f  th is  subsection would no t be consistent w ith  the  religious tenets 
o f  such organization;
(é) th is section shall no t app ly  to  an educational institution 
whose p rim ary  purpose Is th e  tra in in g  o f individuals fo r the  m ili­
ta ry  services o f  th e  U nited  S t a t ^  o r  the  merchant marine ; and 
(5) in  regard  to  admissions th is  section shall no t app ly  to  any 
public institu tion  o f underayaduate higher education i ^ ic h  is  an 
institu tion  th a t  tra d itio n a ry  an d  continually frm n its  establish­
m ent h ^  had  a  policy o f  adm itting  only students o f one sex.
(b) N othing contained in  Subsection (a ) o f  th is  section shall be 
in te ^ re te d  to  require any  educational institution to  g ran t preferential 
o r d isparate trea tm ent to  th e  members o f one sex on account o f an
age o f persons o f th a t  sex partic ipa ting  in  o r  receiving th e  oenefits 
o f  any  federally  supported program  o r activity, in  comparison with 
th e  to ta l num ber o r percentage o f persons of th a t  sex in  any  commu­
n ity . S ta te , section, o r o ther area : Provided^  T h a t th is  subsection shall 
n o t TO construed to  p reven t the  consideration in  any  hearing  o r  pro­
ceeding under th is  t i t le  o f  statistical evidence tend ing  to  show th a t 
such an  imbalance exists w ith  respect to  the  participation  in , o r receipt 
o f th e  benefits of, any  such program  o r  activity  by  Æ e members o f 
one sex.
fo) F o r  purposes o f  th is tit le  an  educational institu tion  means any Definition, 
public o r private  preschool, elementary, o r secondaiy school, o r any 
institu tion  o f  vocational,^ro feœ ional, o r  Ifigher education, except th a t 
in  th e  case o f  an  educational Institu tion  composed o f more tiian  one 
school, college, o r  departm ent w hich are adm inistratively separate 
units, such term  m eans each such school, college, o r d epaitoen t.
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FEDERAL ADSnKISTRATTVB ENFOROEUBKT
Sec. 902. E ach  Federal departoenfc and  agency which is empowered 
to  extend F ederal financial assistance to  any education, program  o r 
^ tiv ity ,  by  way o f g ran t, lo w , o r contract other th an  a  contract o f 
insurance o r guaran ty , is authorized and  directed to  effectuate the  
provisions o f section 901 w ith  respect to  such -program o r activity by 
issuing rulea^ regulations, o r orders o f  general applicability which 
shall be consistent w ith  axdiievement o f  th e  objectives o f th e  statute 
authorizing th e  financial asmstance in  connection w ith which the  
action is  taken. No such rule, regulation, o r  order shall become effective 
unieœ and  un til approved hy th e  Prem dent. Compliance w ith  any 
requirement adopted  pursuant to  th is  section m ay be effected (1) by 
the term ination o f o r refusal to  g ran t o r  to  continue assistance under 
such p rogram  o r  activity to  any  recipient as  to  whom there has l ^ n  
an express finding on th e  record, a f te r  opportunity  fo r  hearing, o f a 
fm lure to  com ply w ith such requirement, b u t such term ination o r 
refusal shall hie l im ited  to  th e  p articu lar political entity, o r  p a rt 
thereof, o r otlmr recipient as to  whom such a  finding has been made, 
and  shall be lim ited in  its  effect to  th e  particu lar program , o r p a rt 
thereof, in  w hich su d i noncompliance baa been so found, o r (2) by 
any other m eans authorized by law ; however. T h a t no  such
action shall be taken un til the  departm ent o r agency concerned has 
advised the  app rop ria te  person o r  persons o f t &  failu re  to  comply 
w ith the  requirem ent and  has determined th a t  compliance cannot be 
secured by  voluntary  m ew s. In  th e  case o f  any action term inating, o r . Report to 
refusing to  g ra n t o r conrinue, assistance because o f fa ilu re  to  comply oon^assionai 
w ith a  requirem ent imposed pursuant to  th is  section, the  head o f the  
Federal departm ent o r agen ty  shall ^ e  w i ^  th e  committees o f the  
House and  Senate having  le ^ la t iv e  jurisdicticm over th e  pro  pram  
o r s c t iv i^  involved a  fu lïw n ttm i report o f the  circumstances and the  
grounds fo r  such action. N o su<^ action shall become effective un til 
riiirty  days have elapsed a fte r th e  filing o f  such report.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
S e c . 903. A n y  d é p a r t e n t  o r agency action taken  pursuan t to  
section 1002 shall be subject to  such judicial review as m ay otherwise 
be provided by  law  fo r  sim ilar action ta te n  by  such departm ent o r 
agency on  o th e r g rounda  I n  the  case o f action, n o t otherwise subject 
to  judicial review, term inating  o r  refusing  to  g ra n t o r  to  continue 
fimanrial asristance upon a  finding o f A llu re  to  com ply w i&  any 
requirement imposed p u rs o w t to  section 902, any  person aggrieved 
(indud ing  any  S ta te  o r  polidcal snbdivirion thereof and  any agency 
o f  d th e r)  m ay obtain judicial review o f such a<^on in  accoxdance
66 STAT. 375
8 0  S t a t .  392.  w ith  d ia p te r  7  o f  rifle U n ited  S ta tes  Code, an d  s u d i acrion shall
5 use 701. n o t be deemed com m itted to  unreviewable agw <y discrerion w ifliin
th e  m eaning o f  section 701 o f  th a t  rifle.
' TBOBXBinOK AGA07BT D lB C B O O K S T lO V f AOADfST *T*mc B U R P
Sec. 904. N o person in  th e  U nited  S ta tes  shall, on  th e  g round o f 
blindness o r  severely im paired  vision, be denied admission in  any  
couree o f s tu d y  b y  a rerip ien t o f  F edera l financial assistance fo r  any  
education p rog ram  o r activ ity , b u t  nofliing herein  shall be  co n ^ m ea  
to  require any  such insriturion to  p rovide a n y  special services to  such 
person because o f  h is  blindness o r  v isual im pairm ent.
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Sbo. 906. KotMsig in  th is  tit le  shall ad d  to  o r  de trac t from  any 
p jn ^ in g  au tho rity  vn th  respect to  any p rogram  o r  activ ity  under 
w h id i F ederal financial assistance is extended oy w ay o f  a  contract o f 
insurance o r guaranty.
A lC E K D lfE K T S  TO O T H E R  LA W S
Ssc. 906. (a )  Sections 4 01(b), 407(a ) (2 ) , 410, and  902 o f  th e  Civil
76 s ta t .  246, R ig h ts  A ct o f  1964 (42%7JS.C. 2000c(b), 2000o-6(a) (2 ) , 2000c-9, and
266. 2000h-2) a re  each amended by  inserting  th e  w ord *'sex** a f te r  th e  word
"religion".
( % ( ! )  Section 13(a) o f  th e  F a i r  lA b o r S tandards  A c t o f 1936 (29 
75 s ta t ;  71. U À C . 2 1 3 (a )) is amended by  inserting  a f te r  th e  w ords " th e  provi-
77 s ta t .  56. s io n s b f  sew o n  6" th e  follow ing: "(excep t section 6 (d ) in  th e  case o f
29 DSC 206. p a rag rap h  (1) o f th is  subsecti(m )
(2 ) P a ra g ra p h  (1 ) o f snhœ ction 8 ( r )  o f such A c t (29 U .S.C . 203 
80 s ta t .  831. ( r )  (1 ) ) is  amended vj d e le ti%  "an  e lem entaiy  o r  secondary school"
a n d  inserting  in  lieu  thereof %  preschool, dem en ta iy  o r  secondary 
school".
S e c tio n 8 (s )(4 ) o f  such A ct (29T J.S .C .203(s)(41) is amended 
tty  deleting  "a n  m em entaiy o r  secondary school" and inserting  in  
lieu  thereof " a  preschool, elem entary o r secondary school".
Z K T Z B FSE T A T rO K  W IT H  B E SFE O T  T O  L m K O  F A C Z L T n z S
S bc. 907. N otw ithstanding any th ing  to  th e  contrary  contained in  
th is  tid e , nod iing  contaIned[herem  sh& l be construed to  p ro h ib it any 
educational instity tion  receiving funds u n d er th is  A ct, from  m ain­
ta in in g  separate liv ing  jkcilities fo r  th e  different sexes.
